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000 UKRAINE: HER STRUGGLE FOR FREEDOM

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Panas Fedenko is a historian, politician, journalist and novelist. He is author of works on Ukrainian history. In 1917 he was elected to the Ukrainian Central Council, the first Ukrainian Parliament in Kiev, and in 1919 to the Ukrainian Congress as member of the Ukrainian Social Democratic Labour Party. As member of the Central Ukrainian Partisan Committee he was concerned with the guerilla war against Russia in 1919—20. He edited Ukrainian Socialist newspapers at home and in exile, where he had to go in 1921. In exile Panas Fedenko taught at the Ukrainian Pedagogic University and the Ukrainian Free University in Prague. Now he is member of the Ukrainian National Council in exile.

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UKRAINE

HER STRUGGLE FOR FREEDOM

PANAS FEDENKO

With one map

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INTRODUCTION

The author of this book is a historian. He has taken part in the Ukrainian national revolution from 1917 on. The book has been written to fix facts that are very often forgotten in the world, or are given a false interpretation in the various books on the Eastern European problem. U 114

The principal fact from which the whole fatal conflict between Ukraine and Soviet Russia arises is that Ukraine has a democratic tradition created by the preceding historical evolution. Modern Russia is a continuation of the Muscovite Tsardom that has grown on the foundations of eastern despotism. For this reason Russia has not created a democratic tradition of its own up to this day and has a "considerable lack of European tradition", as it has been stated by the well known Russian historian Klyuchevsky. Therefore Communist dictatorship so easily seized power in Russia after the revolution of 1917, while the other peoples of the former Tsarist Empire, Ukrainians, Finns, Estonians, Latvians, Lithuanians, Georgians, etc., created democratic states of their own. U 181 SU 181

The tragedy of the unhappy neighbours of Russia is that Russian imperialism in the past and present times has been principally directed against them, has enslaved and even exstirpated them.

The Ukrainian nation occupies a particular place in Eastern Europe both by its number, circa 35 millions, and by its geographical position, and especially by its large natural resources*). The famous British political writer Professor R. W. Seton-Watson states that the Ukrainian problem has been one of the reasons for World War I 1914—1918. It is generally known that the conquest of Ukraine was the principal aim for Hitler's 'Pressure to the East'. Thus World War II had the struggle for Ukraine as one of its reasons too. U 161 155

We are living in a time when imperialism is being condemned as one of the greatest evils to mankind, but we see at the same time U 181

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*) The most important natural riches of Ukraine are: coal (Donets Bassin), iron ore (Krivoy Rog), oil (Boryslaw), manganese (Nikopol). The export of grain from Ukraine to Western Europe until 1914 was higher than 5,5 mil. tons per year. The production of sugar and spirit was very important. The export of agricultural products from Tsarist Russia came in its great part from Ukraine. U 439

181 how various peoples are enslaved and perish through the ruthless despotism of Soviet Russia. Russian Communist dictatorship has ruled the Ukrainian nation for more than 30 years. But the Ukrainians do not want foreign rule and wish to live in freedom and independence. The Ukrainian nation has been the first to fight against the renewed Russian imperialism, strengthened by Communist dictatorship, from December 1917 on. This struggle is little known to the world, though it had in some of its stages universal importance.

CHAPTER I

IMPORTANT FACTS FROM UKRAINIAN HISTORY

The ancient name of the Ukrainian nation was 'Rus' (as a collective name) and 'Rusyn' as the name of the individual. 103

The name Rus was used in the beginning for the tribe of the Polyans near the city of Kiev on the Dnieper River. When the rule of the 'Russian' Princes had spread over other territories inhabited by the ancestors of the Ukrainian nation between the Don River and the Carpathian Mountains, this name was accepted for the whole state. The Finnish tribes on the Oka and Moskva Rivers that were later colonised, gradually took the name 'Rus' as subjects of the 'Rusyns', the Kievan Princes. Usually these territories, united under the rule of the Princes (later Tsars) of Moscow, were called the 'Muscovite State', and the subjects of the Tsar the 'Muscovite people'. The state of the Tsars of Moscow was known in the world as 'Moscoviae Ducatus, Moscovia, Regnum Moscovitarum' etc. At the beginning of the 18th century Tsar Peter I. forbade the official use of the name 'Muscovite State' and ordered his state to be called 'Russia' (from 1721 on 'Russian Empire').

The Ukrainian patriots refused to recognise the name 'Rus' for the Muscovite State for a long time. Thus we read in the anonymous 'Istoriya Rusov' (History of the Ruthenians), written in the second half of the 18th century:

"It is known that we were formerly what the Muscovites are actually (ruling nation, *P. F.*), government, priority, and even the name Rus have passed from us to them, and we are for them like a byword among the heathen".

The word 'Ukraine' is very old. The name 'Rus' was of political origin, it was brought into the territories subordinated to Kiev by the rule of the Princes and the Church hierarchy. The name 'Ukraine' is truly popular. It can be traced back to ancient times in Ukrainian popular songs, in historical tales and legends. In written memorials we find the name of Ukraine in the Hypatian Chronicle, for the first time in 1187: The Prince of Pereyaslav Volodymer died from the wounds he received in a battle against the Polovets (Kuman)

103 nomads "whom Ukraine mourned very much." This popular name gradually supplanted 'Rus'. The nearer to our times, the more the names 'Ukraine', 'Ukrainian' are used*). The name 'Little Russia', which had been used as the official name of Ukraine in Tsarist Russia, was not accepted by the Ukrainian people**).

175 The Ukrainian problem is not new in European history. The Ukrainian nation (Ruthenians), which had lived for millenniums on the territories between the Don River and the Carpathian Mountains, and the Black Sea and the Sea of Azov, has rendered Europe a great service. The knight armies of the Princes of Kiev, Chernigov, Galicia and Volhynia, in heroic exploits defended their country against the nomad hordes, and for centuries did not allow the wild Asiatic tribes to enter Western Europe. A poetical picture of this struggle gives us the famous 'Discourse of the Campaign of Igor' from the 12th century, in which is described the campaign of the 'Rusychi' of Prince Igor against the steppe horde of the Kumans. The powerful Tartar Horde coming from the interior of Asia destroyed the Ukrainian capital Kiev and other cities, and devastated the country in 1240.

After the destruction by the Tartars in the 13th century the Ukrainian public life was concentrated in Galicia and Volhynia. In the 14th century Galician territory was annexed by the Poles after the dynasty of the Galician Princes, the descendants of Vladimir the Saint, had died out. Volhynia and other parts of the Ukrainian territory weakened and devastated by the Tartars, came under the rule of Lithuanian Princes. The Lithuanian state was the immediate continuation of the political and cultural tradition of the Kievan state. The official language of the Lithuanian state was White-Ruthenian and Ukrainian.

With the coming of the Tartars the complete separation of the northern principalities of the former State of Kiev (Suzdal, Ryazan, Moscow, Tver) from Ukraine took place. Under the rule of the Princes of Moscow who 'collected the country', a peculiar system of a centralised despotic state arose. Of the liberal constitu-

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*) The famous Czech scholar Jan Amos Comenius who had lived for a long time in Poland, wrote in a letter dated 24, 5, 1655: "Polonia nostra tota bellis ardet ... tacebo de remotioribus oris Lithuania et *Ukraina*". *The Correspondence of Comenius. Treatises of the Czech Academy of Science*, Class III, Ann. 1, No. 2, p. 179: Prague 1892.

**) The name 'Little Russia' for Ukraine is of scholarly origin. For the first time (1303) it was used in a paper of the Patriarch of Constantinople for the designation of Ukraine as the Metropolis *(μικρὰ 'Ρωσία)* in contrast to Moscow *(μεγάλη 'Ρωσία)* which formerly was hierarchically subordinated to Kiev.

tion of the Kievan State, where the Prince was only a servant of the 175 state and had to reckon with the will of his subjects, — knights and townsmen ('viche'), in Muscovy there was not the slightest trace. The Government of the Princes of Moscow imitated the despotic system of the Tartar 'Golden Horde'. Some Russian historians reject the legend of the taking over of the Kievan traditions by Moscow, and point out the peculiarity of the social and political order of the Muscovite state*). The Princes of Moscow did not tolerate the existence of the Republic of Great Novgorod on the Volkhov River at the side of their despotic state, and after having conquered that country they destroyed by bloody terror the freedom of the Republic of Novgorod (end of 15th century). The liberal traditions of Great Novgorod were definitely wiped out in 1570 by Tsar Ivan the Terrible, who carried out a cruel massacre in this city, and deported a great part of the population to the East. The Muscovite State, which had grown under the protectorate of the Tartar Khans, created a political and social order of its own, after the pattern of the eastern despotisms.

In an article published in the *Review of Politics* (July 1948) the [177] well known American historian Hans Kohn says that the state of the Princes of Kiev, i. e. Ukraine, "looked toward Byzantium, whence it received its Church and toward Scandinavia, from where its dynasty came. When Kiev succumbed to the Mongol invasion, modern Russia was created by the will of the ruthless cunning of the great princes around Moscow.

The new capital grew up, . . ., far from the old cultural centres to the west, on recently colonial land where traditional urban liberties were unknown. Its people were no longer the Slavs of the Dnieper [144] but a new race in which Slav, Finnish, and Mongol blood freely intermingled. From Moscow, no roads led to the West, the rivers pointed to the steppes and deserts of Asia; the political, cultural, and economic ties were with the great empire of the Tartars to whom it was tributary."

The oriental despotic features of the political and economic order of the Muscovite State gave the central government a tremendous power that was used for the enslavement of all social classes and for the seclusion of the Muscovite people from Western Europe. Until the end of the 17th century the Government of the Tsars did not permit its subjects to visit the countries of Western Europe and tried to prevent foreigners from entering their country. The Tsar

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*) Prof. Presnyakov, *The Creation of the Great-Russian State:* Moscow 1918; various works of the historians Lyubavsky, Miliukov and others.

175 was not only the unrestricted lord over the freedom and lives of his subjects; he was also the greatest merchant and contractor in his country (monopoly of foreign trade, monopoly of public houses a. s. o.). Even for the land that was cultivated by the Muscovite people a formula was stated: "The whole land belongs to God and the Tsar."

The Muscovite aristocrats had no power to use against the rule of the Tsars and signed in official papers with deminutive names 'Petrushka', instead of Peter, 'Ivashka', instead of Ivan, and called themselves 'Kholopy' (slaves) of their Tsar. The foreigners from the free Western European countries were impressed by the unlimited submission of the Muscovites to the Government of the Tsars, the lack of personal dignity among them, and their simultaneous enthusiasm for the absolute power of their Tsar, who had not to take an oath on the observation of the laws and the consideration of the liberties of his subjects as was the case in the free Western countries. The learned Scotsman Buchananus writes in his book *De iure regni apud Scotos,* in 1579, that Muscovy rejoices in tyranny ('Moscovia tyrannide gaudet').

[181] The present Communist Government has received the tyrannical tradition from the Tsars of Moscow. Soviet propaganda consequently glorifies one of the most cruel tyrants of universal history — Ivan the Terrible — in its press, literature and radio*). No less is the glorification of Tsar Peter I., the founder of modern Russian imperialism, by the Russian Communists. Here the Bolsheviks have found their corresponding Russian national tradition.

After the destruction of the Kievan State and the down-fall of the Principality of Galicia and Lodomeria the development of Ukraine and White Russia (Byelorussia) under the rule of the Lithuanian princely dynasty went in the general European direction. The nobility and the city population had their rights guaranteed by the laws in Lithuania and Poland, and the Monarch had to consider the will of his subjects. The Ukrainian nobility and the townsmen enjoyed these rights alike. However, after the Union of Lublin of 1569 between Lithuania and Poland almost the whole of Ukrainian territory was incorporated by Poland, and a strong pressure of the Polish State on the Ukrainian people began. The Polish authorities restricted the rights of the Ukrainian Orthodox nobility and, on the other hand, gave those who abandoned the Greek Orthodox Church and turned Catholic all possibilities of career and enrichment. An

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*) Comp.: R. Wipper, *Ivan Grozny:* Moscow 1948 (An official glorification of the 'progressive and democratic' Tsar Ivan the Terrible).

even harder pressure was applied against the Ukrainian townsmen. 175 In those times the conversion of an Orthodox Ukrainian to Catholicism meant Polonisation. Since the end of the 16th century a large number of the Ukrainian nobility having accepted Catholicism left their Ukrainian nationality. The same pressure led to the Polonisation of a great part of the Ukrainian townsmen.

The neighbourhood of the Tartars was an obstacle to the normal development of Ukraine.

On the territory between Kiev and the Black Sea and the Sea of Azov the stubborn struggle of the Ukrainian nation against the Tartars was carried on for centuries. The Tartars captured people from Ukraine and sold them into slavery in the oriental markets. The last invasion of the Crimean Horde into Ukraine was in 1769.

In spite of this permanent danger from the steppe and under these extremely difficult conditions the Ukrainian nation did not abandon its cultural activity.

Schools, literature, printing, developed in Ukraine. The learned [212]
Arab Paul of Aleppo, who visited Ukraine in 1654, wrote in his memoirs that education was common among the Ukrainian people, and that even the Ukrainian women were literate. Academies had also been founded in Ukraine, and were the models and sources of education for all Greek-Orthodox Slav peoples. Ukrainians studied at the Universities of Italy, France, Germany and other countries.

Against the Tartar hordes, the Ukrainians created an organisa- [701]
tion of its own — the Cossack Army. From the middle of the 16th century, the centre of the Ukrainian Cossack Army was in the fortress 'Sich', southward of the Dnieper Cataracts. From this the name of 'Zaporovian Army' arose ('porohy' are the rocks in the Dnieper). The Zaporovian Army performed great deeds in fighting the Tartars. The Ukrainian Cossacks under the leadership of Petro Sahaydachny saved Poland from a terrible Turkish force in the battle of Khotin (Bessarabia), in 1621.

When in 1683 Central Europe was threatened by the Turks, the Ukrainian Cossacks were the force without which the Polish King Jan Sobieski could not dare to begin the decisive battle against the Turks before Vienna.

After the Union of Lublin of 1569, the Polish nobles wanted to take possession of the territory the Ukrainian people had defended against the Tartars. The Polish Government planned to abolish the Ukrainian Cossack Army, and to make the Cossacks serfs of the nobility. The nobility wished to lay their hands on the free peasants of Eastern Ukraine who had not known serfdom. The relations between the Polish Government and the masses of the Ukrainian

175 people deteriorated also in consequence of the religious persecutions of Ukrainians by the Polish State. For these reasons, in 1648 the great Ukrainian revolution against Poland broke out under the leadership of Bohdan Khmelnitsky (1648—1657), the Hetman of the Cossack Army.

[642] In consequence of the revolution of 1648 the Ukrainian Cossack
175 Republic was created headed by an elected Chief of State (Hetman).
648 The official name of this State was 'Zaporovian Army' (Exercitus Zaporoviensis) with Tchyhyryn as Capital. Leaning upon the Cossacks and the free peasantry, the Ukrainian Republic could defend itself against the united forces of Poland and the Crimean Horde for several years. Having lost the hope for a settlement with Poland on the principle of equality, the Ukrainian Government concluded a treaty with the Muscovite Tsar in Pereyaslav, in 1654. The Muscovite Tsar promised the Ukrainians assistance against Poland and the Tartars. The treaty of Pereyaslav secured for Ukraine its own army, administration, and an independent foreign policy.

The transition of Ukraine towards Moscow in the 17th century provided the basis for the rise of the Muscovite state. The Ukrainian revolution of 1648 weakened Poland considerably.

Under the protectorate of the Tsar of Moscow Ukraine did not find security for its liberty, prosperity and progress. The Swedish King Charles X. Gustav understood this well when he wrote to his Ambassador to the Ukrainian Government, in 1657: "Moscow does not tolerate a free nation"*). When it had become evident that the Tsar of Moscow tried to reduce or to abolish the rights of Ukraine, the Ukrainian Government of B. Khmelnitsky planned the annulment of the alliance with Moscow, and concluded treaties with Sweden and Transylvania to secure the independence of Ukraine (1656 and 1657). The Ukrainian Government put forward the demand for the frontiers of the Ukrainian State as '*ius totius Ukrainae antiquae vel Roxolaniae*' up to the Vistula, the Ukrainian ethnographic frontier of that time. In the treaty with Sweden of 1657, Ukraine was recognised as a free nation dependent on no one *('gens libera, nulli subiecta')*.

Against the Ukrainian aspirations for independence Poland and Moscow acted in common. By the treaty of Andrusov of 1667, Ukraine was divided among these countries on the Dnieper line. Turkey and the Crimean Horde interfered with the struggle in Ukraine. In these wars, lasting nearly 30 years, Ukraine on the western bank of the Dnieper River was disastrously devastated. In

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*) *Archives of South-West Russia*, Part III, Vol. VI: Kiev 1908.

a treaty between Turkey, Moscow, and Poland of 1681, it was /175
determined to depopulate Ukraine between the South Bug and 648
Dnieper Rivers to the Black Sea. The western Ukrainian territories (Volhynia, Galicia etc.) remained under Polish rule. Ukraine to the East of the Dnieper remained under the protectorate of the Muscovite Tsars, preserving restricted autonomous rights, with an elected Hetman as the head of the Government.

Tsar Peter I. planned the abolition of the remains of the autonomous order of Ukraine on the Eastern bank of the Dnieper. In order to defend the freedom of Ukraine, Hetman Ivan Mazeppa concluded an alliance with the Swedish King Charles XII. against Russia in 1708. The battle of Poltava (1709), fatal for Ukraine and Sweden, put an end to the plans of the Ukrainian patriots to restore Ukrainian independence. Nonetheless, for decades even in the second half of the 18th century, the members of the Ukrainian Government which went into exile in 1709, continued in various countries their diplomatic action for the defence of the Ukrainian independence. They were headed by Hetman Pylyp Orlyk, the successor of Mazeppa, and included the son of Hetman Orlyk, Hryhor Orlyk, General in the French service, Fedir Myrovych and others.

After the battle of Poltava the Russian Government restricted [661]
the autonomous rights of Ukraine considerably. Tsar Peter I. /175
deliberately destroyed Ukraine in order to oppress her people the more easily, as we are informed by Weber, the Resident of Brunswick-Hannover in Moscow, a contemporary of Tsar Peter I.*). Ukraine was forced to pay heavy contributions, Ukrainians were sent in masses to the North to build Petersburg, the new capital of the Tsars. Many thousands of Ukrainians died from exhaustion while working for the strengthening of Russian Tsarist despotism. At the same time Moscow took from Ukraine its best cultural workers — scholars, artists, artisans. Western civilisation was introduced to Russia principally by Ukrainian intellectuals. (See K. Kharlampovich, *Little Russian Influence on the Great Russian Ecclesiastical Life:* Kazan, 1912; and Pekarsky, *Science and Literature in the Time of Peter* — I — II).

The Tsarina Catherine II. abolished the autonomous Ukrainian Government in 1764. Ukraine was brought to the level of the other provinces of the Tsarist Empire.

The Russian Government decided also to destroy the Zaporovian Army, the nest of democratic liberty in Ukraine. In 1775, Russian

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*) **Weber, Das veränderte Rußland: Hannover 1729.**

175 troops conquered the fortress of the Ukrainian Cossacks — the Zaporovian Sich. The remainder of the Zaporovian Cossacks migrated to the Turkish province at the mouth of the Danube, and founded there a new centre under the protectorate of the Sultan. The lands of the Zaporovian Army, that had been defended against the Tartar hordes in a fierce struggle lasting for hundreds of years, the Russian Government granted to its magnates, first of all to favourites of Catherine II.

175 648 The Western Ukrainian territories, which, by the Polish-Muscovite treaty of 1667, had remained in the Polish State after the dismemberment of Poland at the end of the 18th century, were incorporated partly by Russia and partly by Austria (Galicia 1772). Bukovina too, which had formerly belonged to Turkey, became a province of Austria in 1774. Carpatho-Ukraine had belonged to Hungary since the Middle Ages (cities Užhorod-Ungvar, Mukačevo-Munkacs).

181 175 [566] The struggle of the Ukrainians for independence under the leadership of Bohdan Khmelnitsky (1648—57) had abolished serfdom in the greater part of Ukraine. It was the ideal of the masses of the Ukrainian people to live free, independent like the free Ukrainian Cossacks. After the abolition of the autonomous rights of Ukraine at the end of the 18th century serfdom for the Ukrainian peasants was introduced in Ukraine in the Muscovite way. But against this oppression the masses of the Ukrainian people rose often in revolt.

Historical evolution has developed in the Ukrainian people an aspiration for freedom and defence of human dignity. Voltaire wrote in his *History of Charles XII.:* "L'Ukraine a toujours aspiré à être libre" (Ukraine has always aspired to be free). "This is a nation that wants freedom," wrote the prominent Ukrainian writer of the 17th century, the Archbishop of Chernigov, Lazar Baranovych, to the Muscovite Tsar Alexey Mikhaylovich.

The conviction prevailed among the Ukrainians that Ukraine was not dependent on Russia but was only associated in the person of the Monarch. In the political dialogue *Dispute of Little Russia with Great Russia* at the end of the 18th century we read the following words of 'Little Russia' addressing 'Great Russia': "Do not think thou art my lord, but thine and mine sovereign is our common master."

175 648 The Ukrainian patriots could not forget the loss of liberty and independence, and looked for understanding of the Ukrainian case to foreign countries. In 1793 the well known Ukrainian patriot Vasyl Kapnist tried to persuade the Prussian Minister Hertzberg

that it was in the interest of Prussia to help the Ukrainian people 175 to cast off the chains of Muscovite slavery. During the Great French 648 Revolution the person of Napoleon was very popular in Ukraine. Ukrainian patriots were pleased by the victories of the French Emperor, and hoped that, after the defeat of Russia in a war with France, the time for the liberation of Ukraine would come, and the odious serfdom would be abolished. But Napoleon had no understanding of the Ukrainian problem. He planned the creation of two states 'Napoléonides' in Ukraine under his protectorate ...*)

Ukrainian history has gone its own way, different from that of Russia. This has created the peculiar national character of the Ukrainians.

The foreigners who had visited Ukraine in the 17th and 18th 175 centuries pointed out the higher level of civilisation among the 181 Ukrainians in comparison with the Russians, and the highly deve- 517 loped feeling of personal dignity of the Ukrainian people. This love of freedom of the Ukrainian people appeared also in the fight against Tsarist absolutism in Russia, where revolutionaries of Ukrainian origin occupied the first places, Zhelyabov, Kybalchych, Konashevych, Osynsky, Kravchynsky (Stepnyak), Popko, and many other members of the party *'Narodnaya Volya'*.

In the 19th century, under the influence of the ideas of that time (the Great French Revolution, romanticism) the regeneration of the so-called unhistorical pepoples (Serbians, Bulgarians, Czechs, Slovaks, Baltic peoples) began; in the beginning it was the interest for the language and history of the peoples among the educated classes, and the attempt to write in the 'common people's' language. [538] In Ukraine the regeneration of the popular literary language began with the publication of the satirical poem of Ivan Kotlyarevsky *Aeneid:* 1798. In this poem the author underlines his dislike of serfdom and the lords

> "who did not give the people freedom
> and treated them like cattle."

Democratic ideas were widespread in Ukraine; the representatives 175 of the Ukrainian educated classes took an active part in the 186 revolutionary organisations directed towards the fall of the Tsarist régime (the uprising of the 'Decabrists', 1825—26, was most active in Ukraine, near Kiev).

In 1846 a Ukrainian political organisation, *The Society of St. Cyrill and Methodius,* was founded in Kiev. Many prominent representatives of Ukrainian culture like Taras Shevchenko (the

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*) ***Revue des Etudes Napoléoniennes:* Paris 1922.**

175 greatest Ukrainian poet), Mykola Kostomarov, historian, Pantelei-
186 mon Kulish, historian and poet, Mykola Hulak, and others, took
part in this organisation.

In the declarations of this society the idea of an independent Ukrainian democratic republic was promulgated: "And Ukraine will resurrect from her grave ... And Ukraine will be an independent republic" *(The Books of the Being of the Ukrainian Nation,* the work of the Society of St. Cyrill and Methodius).

The Russian Government punished the members of this society severely and acted rigorously against Ukrainian political and cultural regeneration.

[191] In 1863 the Russian Minister Valuyev declared that "the Ukrainian language did not exist, does not exist and cannot exist." In 1876, by a secret order of the Tsar, the printing and circulation of Ukrainian books, periodicals etc. in the Russian Empire was prohibited. Even the Bible in Ukrainian was forbidden. Ukrainian could not be tought in schools. The Ukrainian press in the Russian Empire was forbidden until 1905. Only the revolution of 1917 made the introduction of Ukrainian in schools possible. This prohibition of the living language of a considerable nation, the instrument of its culture, had disastrous consequences for the Ukrainian people and is a feature absolutely unique in universal history.

[871] The prohibition of the Ukrainian language in the schools and in
175 the press hindered the development of education in Ukraine. The
statistics show that the number of schools and the level of education
517 in Ukraine were higher in the 18th century than in the 19th*). On the other hand, the Russian schools separated the educated classes of the Ukrainian nation from their nationality, and put the intelligentsia of Ukrainian origin into the service of Russian culture. Thus, besides the economic exploitation to the advantage of the Russian Empire, Ukraine was deprived of her best intellectual forces which were drowned in the 'Russian Sea'. We can quote here only some names of prominent Ukrainians who, by virtue of circumstances, helped to create the Russian civilisation, and gave their talents for the increase of the Russian Empire: Archbishop Theophan Prokopovych, the deputy of the Patriarch of Moscow Stephan Javorsky, Bishop Dmytro Rostovsky — were prominent Ukrainian scholars of the time of Tsar Peter I. who were forced

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*) Thus there were in 1748 in four regiments (Ukraine had a military Cossack administration) of the Hetmanate (for three regiments the figures are missing) 866 elementary schools, i. e., one school for 1000 inhabitants. From this, little or almost nothing remained in the 19th century.

to leave Ukraine and to serve the Muscovite State. The Ukrainian, 175 Prince Alexander Bezborodko, directed for many years Russian 517 foreign policy in the time of Catherine II. (1762—1796) and of Paul I., who is known, however, to have disliked Russia and to have dreamt of a free Ukraine. The greatest talents of modern Russian literature, Gogol and Dostoyevsky, were of Ukrainian origin; Gogol did not master Russian exactly until the end of his life, it was strange to him. Far-famed scholars — Maxim Kovalevsky, sociologist; the philosophers Lesevich and Yurkevich, Vladimir Vernadsky, geologist, the famous painter Ilya Repin, — were Ukrainians of whom Russian culture is proud.

The Ukrainians in the provinces of Austria, Galicia and Bukovina 175 had lost their educated classes under the rule of the Poles and 186 Turks. Here, as well as in the Ukrainian territory to the West of [668] the Carpathian Mountains, Carpatho-Ukraine, which was under Hungarian rule, the Ukrainians were principally peasants; the cities were mostly not-Ukrainian. During the 'Spring of the Peoples' in 1848 the Ukrainian national movement in Austria and Hungary also appeared. In Galicia the Ruthenian Supreme Council — a political representative of the Ukrainians in Austria — was created. At the elections for the Austrian Parliament the Ukrainians secured a considerable number of mandates. The national rebirth began also in the Ukrainian territory on the western side of the Carpathian Mountains. But the reaction which occured in Austria hindered the Ukrainian national development. The Vienna Government put the Ukrainians in Galicia and Carpatho-Ukraine under Polish and Hungarian rule respectively in order to make the Poles and Hungarians loyal towards Austria. This enabled the Poles and Hungarians to conduct a policy of denationalisation against the Ukrainians. Only at the end of the 19th century, in spite of great hindrances on the part of the Poles, a Ukrainian political and cultural life developed in Galicia. In connection with this, [517] Ukrainian science and literature, prohibited in Kiev, Kharkov, and [814] Odessa, found a home in Galicia (Lviw), and Bukovina (Chernivtsi). Ukrainians from Tsarist Ukraine published here their periodicals and books; here, under the direction of the famous Kievan historian Michael Hrushevsky, the Ukrainian Shevchenko Scientific Society developed. It was by its energy a real Ukrainian Academy of Science.

Gradually the Ukrainians in Austria were overcoming the obstacles created by the ruling class of the Polish nobility, and secured new mandates in the Austrian Parliament and the Galician Diet.

186 The development of Ukrainian political and cultural life in
665 Austria had a great influence on the Ukrainians condemned to ruthless Russification under Tsarist rule. When the first modern Ukrainian political organisation in Tsarist Russia, the Ukrainian Revolutionary Party, was founded in 1900 (from 1905 this party was named Ukrainian Social Democratic Labour Party) its first publication *Independent Ukraine* was printed in Austria, in Bukovina.

86 The Ukrainian patriots under Tsarist Russian Government,
668 morally and materially supported the fight of the Ukrainians in Galicia and Bukovina for their national rights; these territories were a Ukrainian Piedmont. For not even the revolution of 1905 gave the Ukrainians in Russia their national rights. Of course, the Ukrainians had their deputies in the Russian 'Duma' who demanded autonomy for Ukraine. But the Ukrainian language was not admitted in the schools, the rights of the Ukrainian press were restricted, and active Ukrainians were persecuted by the Russian authorities. Among the Ukrainians in Russia the fight of the Austrian Ukrainians for the creation of a Ukrainian University in Lviw roused great interest. The Russian Government regarded the creation of a Ukrainian University in Galicia as a great danger for the 'indivisible Russia' and sought an agreement with the Polish nationalists in Galicia against the Ukrainian movement. The Russian nationalists regarded the opening of a Ukrainian University in Lviw as a 'casus belli' for Russia against Austria.

668 The Russian Government closely watched the Ukrainian move-
661 ment in Austria and was much alarmed by its successes. In consequence, the Petersburg Government prepared to annex Galicia and Bukovina long before the war of 1914, in order to wipe out 'Mazeppism'. When, in 1914, at the beginning of World War I, a Ukrainian delegation visited Minister of Foreign Affairs Sazonov to protest against the new prohibition of the Ukrainian press in the Russian Empire, the Minister replied cynically:

"Now the time has come to put an end to your Ukrainian movement once for all ...".

727 The suppression of the Ukrainian movement was one of the main
661 aims of Tsarist Russian policy in World War I. The occupation of
Galicia and Bukovina by the Russian armies in 1914-1917 brought
heavy damage to the Ukrainian movement; the Ukrainian schools,
press, co-operative societies, scientific and educational institutions
727 were destroyed. Thousands of Ukrainians, Austrian citizens, were
659 deported to Siberia. In the occupied territories a ruthless Russifica-
661 tion was started, and in Galicia the forced conversion of the Greek-

8: Fedenko H-4, 5 (no date) 1951 RD1 Ukraine RD1

Catholic Ukrainians to Greek Orthodoxy was taking place. The 727
Ukrainian Metropolitan of the Greek-Catholic Church in Galicia, 661
Count Andrew Szeptycki, was arrested and deported to the interior 657
of Russia, and with him numerous Ukrainian clergymen. This policy of oppression of the Ukrainians in Galicia and Bukovina was cynically referred to by the Russian Government as 'liberation of subjugated Slav brethren'...

CHAPTER II

UKRAINE DURING THE REVOLUTION 1917—1920

1. The Ukrainian Central Council

000 In March 1917, the revolution overthrew the Tsarist Government in Russia. This enabled the oppressed peoples of the former Tsarist Empire to declare their rights for political self-determination. These were: the Finns, Estonians, Latvians, Lithuanians, Poles, White Ruthenians (Byelorussians), the Caucasian peoples (Georgians, Armenians, Azerbaidjanians), the peoples of Turkestan and above all the most numerous nation after the Russians, — the Ukrainians.

668 631 646 In March 1917, the Ukrainian Central Council in Kiev was formed from the representatives of the Ukrainian political organisations as representative of the Ukrainian nation. Ukrainian congresses of workers, peasants, and soldiers, also elected their deputies to the Central Council, and thus this organ became a provisional Parliament of Ukraine. The Ukrainian Central Council tried first to realise the autonomous order in Ukraine through an agreement with the Russian Provisional Government of Prince Lvov-Kerensky.

But the Ukrainian efforts to attain autonomy met with the resolute opposition of the Russian Provisional Government and of the Russian political parties. The centralist tradition of Tsarist Russia continued to live in Russian political parties with the same vigour even after the fall of the régime. The delegates of the Central Council applied to the Russian Provisional Government in Petersburg to recognise by a public act the right of the Ukrainian nation to autonomy within the Russian state. The Russian Government refused this demand, declaring that the problem of autonomy for Ukraine should be decided by the All-Russian Constituent Assembly. This reply could not satisfy the Ukrainians. For it was evident that the Russian Constituent Assembly, with the centralist efforts of the Russian parties having a majority would refuse the autonomous rights of non-Russian peoples.

Thus the Ukrainian Central Council began to realise the necessity for Ukraine to establish an autonomous order itself, without taking into notice the threats of the Russian political parties and the Russian Government. Under these conditions the Ukrainian Central Council issued its '*Universal*' (Declaration) to the Ukrainian nation on June 10, 1917 (old style), which contained among other statements the following words: 668 631

"Ukraine shall be free ... The Ukrainian nation shall have the right to organise its life itself. A Ukrainian Assembly of the Ukrainian nation (Diet), elected in general, equal, direct and secret ballot, shall secure order in Ukraine. All laws securing this order here, in Ukraine, can be issued only by our Ukrainan Assembly".

The policy of the Ukrainian Central Council, of which the great majority was composed of the representatives of Ukrainian Socialist parties, met with strenous attacks on the part of the Russians. Only the leader of the Russian Communists, Lenin, for tactical reasons seeking support among the Ukrainians in the struggle of his party against the Provisional Government, made the following hypocritical statement:

"No democrat can deny the right of Ukraine for a free separation from Russia (*Pravda* 15. 6. 1917). In reality, Lenin and his party were enemies of the national self-determination of Ukraine and other nations oppressed by Russia. The Russian Communist Government showed it immediately after having seized power in Russia on November 7, 1917.

The development of the Ukrainian political movement forced the Russian Provisional Government to begin negotiations with the Ukrainian Central Council. In summer 1917, an agreement was reached, and the representatives of the parties of all national minorities sent their delegates to the Ukrainian Central Council. But the policy of Kerensky's Russian Government continued to hinder the creation of an autonomous order in Ukraine. The Petersburg Government recognised the rights of autonomy only for the northern part of Ukraine and kept the whole of southern Ukraine under its administration. But even for the realisation of this restricted autonomy the Russian Government put obstacles in the way of the Ukrainian Central Council. At the end of September 1917, the Ukrainian Central Council passed a resolution to call a separate Constituent Assembly for Ukraine. The Russian Provisional Government, for this reason, began a legal prosecution against the Central Council. But at this time a revolt happened in Russia, the Bolshevik Party seized power (November 7, 1917). This created a new situation in the relations between Ukraine and Russia.

2. Soviet Russia and Democratic Ukraine

668 Bolshevism was the consequence of the previous development of the Russian people, who never had had in their history any free political order. Soviet dictatorship did not meet with any serious resistance in Russia proper. The Russians showed in their attitude towards the Communist rule their traditional 'sense of obedience', as it was expressed by a Russian publicist (Guber, *On the Change of the Sign-Posts:* Prague, 1922)*). Another situation arose in Ukraine and other non-Russian regions of the former Tsarist Empire. The Russian Communist organisation in Ukraine was weak and had no support among the Ukrainian population. Among the Russian and Jewish workers in Ukraine the influence of Democratic Socialism, '*Menshevism*', also predominated. Thus, under the leadership of the Ukrainian Central Council all parties, Ukrainian, Russian, Jewish and Polish, acted together against the plans of the Russian Bolsheviks to establish dictatorship in Ukraine. The Ukrainian Central Council blamed Bolshevik dictatorship in Russia, and began to realise the autonomous order in Ukraine, independent of the Soviet Russian Government. In its '*III. Universal*' from November 20, 1917, the Ukrainian Central Council proclaimed Ukraine a democratic republic. In this document we read: 668 631

"In the Ukrainian Democratic Republic all liberties will be guaranteed: freedom of speech, printing, religion, meetings, associations, strikes, inviolability of person and domicile, the right to use local languages in intercourse with all offices. The Ukrainian nation had fought for long years for its national liberty, and now having attained it, will firmly protect the freedom of national development of all nationalities remaining in Ukraine; therefore we announce to the Russian, Jewish, Polish and other peoples in Ukraine a national and personal autonomy to secure their right and liberty of self-government in matters of their national life . . ." [563]

In the III. Universal the Ukrainian Central Council fixed the elections to the Ukrainian Constituent Assembly for December 27, 1917.

The Ukrainian Government did not want to conclude a separate peace with the Central Powers which the Russian Communist Government under Lenin's direction was aiming at. Therefore the Ukrainian Central Council in its '*Universal*' of November 20, 1917,

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***) The well known Russian writer Maxim Gorki wrote on the passivity of the Russians towards their oppressors that the "Russians could suffer more than work consciously and honestly" (*Communist International,* No. 3, Moscow 1919).**

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declared: "Until the peace every citizen of the Ukrainian Republic, together with the citizens of all peoples of the Russian Republic, shall stand firmly on their positions at the front and in the hinterland".

The Soviet Russian Government was from the beginning hostile to the national claims of Ukraine and other peoples. Relying on its own military force and the support of Communist groups among the various peoples of the former Tsarist Empire, the Soviet Russian Government was planning the conquest of Ukraine and other territories that did not recognise Soviet dictatorship.

3. Elections for the All-Russian Constituent Assembly in Russia and in Ukraine

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At the end of November, 1917, in Ukraine and Russia, elections for the All-Russian Constituent Assembly took place. These elections in Ukraine were free, with full freedom of press and propaganda for all parties, among them the Communist. These elections showed the great difference between the political situation in Russia and in Ukraine. In Russia the adherents of Soviet dictatorship (the Communists and the party of the Left Socialists-Revolutionaries), especially in the big cities like Moscow and Petersburg, had considerable gains. This gave the Communists and Left Socialists-Revolutionaries the basis for holding power in Russia; for they had the masses of friendly workers and peasants behind them. In Ukraine at these elections the Ukrainian Socialist parties, opponents of Soviet dictatorship, won (the Ukrainian Social Democratic Party and the Ukrainian Party of Socialists-Revolutionaries got together approximately $^3/_4$ of all cast votes). The Russian Communist Party, in spite of the immense resources from Russia for propaganda, gained in Ukraine less than 10% of the votes. In the big cities, among the workers, the Russian Communists were in a minority too; this explains the uncertainty of the Communists in Ukraine at that time in the struggle for the dictatorship of their party.

The historian of the Communist movement in Ukraine, M. Popov, remarks that even in the big industrial centres in Ukraine "the local Communists had a lack of determination to take power into the hands of the Soviets", *History of the Communist Party 'Bolsheviks' of Ukraine:* Kharkov, 1929.

4. The Problem of Peace with the Central Powers

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At the end of 1917 the Russian front against the Central Powers was decaying in a catastrophic way. This decay was hastened by the ruthless Communist propaganda for an immediate peace. In

648 order to secure the country, the Ukrainian Government began to concentrate in Ukraine the troops that had been separated from the Russian Army. The Ukrainian Government was against a separate peace with the Central Powers, as it was afraid to come under the influence of these nations. Thus in the session of the Ukrainian Central Council on December 25, 1917, the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Alexander Choulguine, declared:

"The Bolsheviks are preparing to conclude a separate peace. We do not agree with this, we cannot permit that the Germans and Austrians move their regiments against the French and British. We stand for a general peace that would be welcomed by the democracy of the whole world".

[665] Against this policy of the Ukrainian Government the Russian Communist Party acted with demagogic propaganda.

On January 13, 1918, the newspaper of the Russian Communist Party in Kiev *The Proletarian Thought* wrote:

"The Central Council tries to destroy the struggle for peace... The Council is working in this direction by order of the 'allied' imperialists. The workers, soldiers and peasants of Ukraine and Russia know and remember well that, in their struggle for the immediate ending of the slaughter, the Central Council is their determined enemy and a faithful servant of the sharks of capital and of international robbers...".

5. *Great Britain and France Recognise Democratic Ukraine*

The position of the Ukrainian Government in the question of peace attracted the attention of Great Britain and France. At the beginning of December 1917, General Tabouis entered into relations with the Ukrainian Government as Commissioner of the French Republic to the Ukrainian Government. On January 11, 1918, General Tabouis handed to the Ukrainian Government the following declaration:

"Wishing to confirm its friendly intentions towards the Ukrainan Republic, the Government of the French Republic informed me by telegraph, the only present means of communication, that it appointed me as Representative of the French Republic to the Government of the Ukrainian Republic. It will soon be a year that I have been on the territory of Ukraine. In this time I had the opportunity to study the history of Ukraine, I watched with attention the development of its national movement, and I could observe the efforts the Ukrainian Republic had made in order to create and to strengthen the moral and physical forces necessary for the organisation of the state. I have watched all this with interest that grew steadily and I am happy and proud, President, to 648 see that to-day this interest is not only personal, for, appointing me as its Representative, the Government of the French Republic approves my efforts and charges me to continue officially the excellent relations that have developed between us. I bring you the official assurance that France, which as the first country is undertaking this decisive step, will support with all her power the Ukrainian Republic in those endeavours she will undertake to continue to walk on that road the Allies had chosen, and on which they will march without hesitation, thoroughly conscious of their rigths and their duties towards the democracy of the whole world and of humanity... From this day forward France has entered into official relations with Ukraine".

The Government of Great Britain appointed likewise its representative to the Government of the Ukrainian Republic, Sir Picton Bagge. In his letter to the Ukrainian Government Sir Picton wrote:

"My Government has charged me to assure you of its best intentions. It will support with all its strength the Ukrainian Government in the task it will undertake in creating an efficient administration, securing order and fighting the Central Powers".

6. *The War of Soviet Russia against Ukraine*

In December 1917, the Russian Bolshevik organisations in Ukraine, leaning on the Russian armed forces stationed in the Ukrainian cities, tried to overthrow the Government of the Ukrainian Central Council and to set up the dictatorship of the Communist Party. The Ukrainian Government disarmed the Russian armed forces and sent them over the boundaries of Ukraine. After this the Soviet Russian Government put to the Ukrainian Government an ultimatum to stop in Ukraine the disarming of Russian troops, which were friendly to Communist dictatorship, and to return the arms to the troops already disarmed. 669

"If after 48 hours no satisfactory reply will be given, the Council of the People's Commissars will consider the Ukrainian Central Council to be at war with the Government of the Soviets in Russia and Ukraine", so ended the ultimatum of the Russian Communist Government.

For fighting the Ukrainian Democratic Republic the Russian Soviet Government created its puppet 'Government of Soviet Ukraine'. This 'government' took up its residence in Kharkov, captured by troops sent from Russia. The Kharkov 'Ukrainian

669 Government' was window-dressing for the further advance of the Russian Communist troops in Ukraine.

At this time the Russian and Jewish Socialist parties in Ukraine issued protests against the attack of the Soviet Russian troops on the democratic Ukraine. In December 1917, a conference of the Russian Social-Democrat organisations in Ukraine (the so-called Mensheviks) in Kiev declared that it "brands with indignation the new infamous deed of the Bolshevik Government, that in its blunt fanaticism and irresponsibility came to declare war on Ukraine".

In the session of the All-Ukrainian Congress of the Councils of the Workers', Soldiers' and Peasants' Deputies in Kiev on December 18, 1917, the delegate of the Jewish Social-Democrat 'Bund', Zolotarev, declared that "the Jewish proletariat will defend Ukraine together with the Ukrainian nation against the attack of the violators".

At the same Congress the leader of the Jewish Socialist Labour Party, Schatz, in his speech laid stress on the fact that "now in Russia only one organising force has remained — the Ukrainian democracy and its organ — the Central Council"

Ukraine refused to accept Soviet dictatorship and entered an unequal struggle with overwhelming Communist forces invading [642] from Russia. The Ukrainian Central Council proclaimed the independence of the Ukrainian Democratic Republic by a special Act ('*IV. Universal*') of January 22, 1918. It is significant that even some Russian Communist organisations in Ukraine declared against the attack of Soviet Russia on Ukraine.

One of the commanders of the Russian invasion in Ukraine, the Communist Antonov-Ovseyenko, writes in his memoirs that in December 1917, the leader of the Communsit organisations in Kharkov demanded that he should not make war against the Ukrainian Government, with regard to the "special situation in Ukraine in connection with the national problem" (*Comments on the Civil War*, vol. I, p. 55). On this disposition of the Communists in Ukraine Antonov remarks:

"The local Communists are very irresolute, are looking for coalition with opportunists, do not want and do not try to give our troops any assistance" *(Comments on the Civil War)*.

Another commander of the Soviet Russian troops in Ukraine, Colonel Muravyev, wired Antonov from Odessa on February 21, 1918, about the disposition of the workers: "I do not want to carry responsibility for anything that is happening here, if the local Soviets do not want to defend the revolution, their own government" (Antonov, *Comments*, p. 169).

7. The Policy of the Russian Communists in Ukraine in 1918

The behaviour of the Soviet Russian troops in Ukraine was extremely hostile towards all that was Ukrainian. After the conquest of Kiev in February 1918, the Soviet commander Muravyev in his order Nr. 14 wrote: "We bring this government from the far North on the points of our bayonets, and where we set up our rule we support it with all means by the strength of these bayonets . . ."

In the Ukrainian capital Kiev, the Bolshevik troops made a terrible pogrom of all Ukrainian cultural institutions: Ukrainian books, the pictures of Ukrainian writers were destroyed: people who had documents written in Ukrainian were shot, etc. This policy of the Russian Communists in Ukraine is attested by the statement of a Communist of Ukrainian origin, Vasyl Shakhray, who was in spring 1918, Commissar of War in the 'People's Secretariat' (this was the name of the Government of Soviet Ukraine appointed from Moscow):

"What a 'Ukrainian Government' is this whose members do not properly know and do not wish to know Ukrainian? . . . What a Ukrainian Minister of War am I, if I have to disarm all Ukrainian troops, for they do not want to go with me to defend the Soviet Government? We have only one military support in our fight with the Central Council — the army that was brought into Ukraine by Antonov, which regards all that is Ukrainian as hostile, counter-revolutionary" (*Annals of the Revolution*, No. 1, p. 162: Kharkov, 1928).

The campaign of the Russian Communists against Ukraine had not only political reasons: it was the desire of the Moscow Government to seize the food resources, grain, sugar and other agricultural products, and the natural resources of the Ukraine, iron ore, coal, etc. With the Communist 'Red Guards' the organisers of requisitions of food for Russia came to Ukraine. The commander of the Soviet Russian troops in Ukraine, Antonov-Ovseyenko, wired to one of the Russian Commissars in charge of supply on January 23, 1918: "You must appoint your representatives for the Gubernias of Kharkov and Poltava . . . who shall conduct the requisitions of grain according to a fixed plan . . . leaning upon an armed force that has been appointed by Moscow and Petersburg for this front particularly". (*Comments on the Civil War*, vol. 1, p. 184).

The Soviet Russian troops exported from Ukraine to Russia everything they regarded as necessary in masses, even the machines and outfitting of factories. Of course, this pillage roused great discontent among the masses of the Ukrainian people. Even greater

669 indignation was caused by the bloody Communist terror that took
thousands of innocent people as its victims. The war of Soviet Rus-
186 sia against Ukraine and the terror by the Russian 'Red Guards' in
Ukraine, still strengthened among the Ukrainians the will to fight for their national independence. This was expressed in an essay by the President of the Ukrainian Central Council, Professor Hrushevsky, the most authoritative personality of Ukrainian political life of that time. Hrushevsky wrote:

"The first matter I have to lay stress on is that from now, in our relations with Moscow, a radical change has taken place. It is vain to look for a possibility of living with the Russians in the boundaries of one state. We had sincerely believed that in a new Russia the Ukrainian nation could find the necessary conditions for its manifold development. Now we have lost this belief. We have convinced ourselves that our ways differ from those of a reactionary or a revolutionary Russia. After the unprecedented barbaric atrocities of the Russian Bolsheviks against the Ukrainian people, after the cruel shelling of the Ukrainian capital by the Soviet Russian troops, in our relations with Russia a new period begins. Ukraine has to continue her struggle for liberation in order to create an independent state. Our social and political ideals must be based not on the examples of oriental despotism, but on the principles of the life and development of civilised Europe, where, before all, human dignity is valued. Ukraine has always stood in her history culturally and politically nearer to Western Europe. If we want to liberate ourselves from foreign violence, we have to conform to the civilised West" (*On the Threshold of New Ukraine:* Kiev, 1918).

8. The Treaty of Brest-Litovsk

728 The Soviet Russian Government had by its ruthless propaganda for an immediate peace treaty definitely disorganised the front against the Central Powers. Thus the representatives of the Ukrainian Government took part in the peace negotiations with the Central Powers in Brest-Litovsk. The diplomats of the Central Powers gave the Ukrainian Government in the negotiations with the Ukrainian delegates various facilities in order to secure a 'grain treaty' with Ukraine. For the food situation of the Central Powers at that time was fatal. The peace treaty between Ukraine and the Central Powers was concluded in Brest-Litovsk on February 9, 1918. As at that time a great part of Ukraine was occupied by the Soviet Russian troops, it was in the interest of the Central Powers to interrupt the export of grain to Russia, and to use the food

resources of Ukraine for themselves. The armies of the Central 728 Powers came into Ukraine.

Under the pressure of the Ukrainian armed forces and the armies 669 of the Central Powers the Soviet 'Red Guards' had to leave Ukrainian 665 territory. The discontent of the masses of the Ukrainian people against the pillage and terror of the Soviet troops was so great that everywhere in Ukraine uprisings against the Russian occupation broke out. This moral and political failure of the Russian Soviet régime was a heavy blow to the Communist movement in Ukraine. For this reason in May 1918, even the 'Government of Soviet Ukraine' was abolished. But for propaganda purposes it was decided to create a 'Communist Party (Bolsheviks) of Ukraine', formally independent from the Russian party. This party held its congress in July 1918, in Moscow. The congress passed the resolution:

"To fight for the revolutionary union of Ukraine and Russia on the principles of proletarian centralism within the boundaries of the Soviet Russian Republic". Thus the 'Communists of Ukraine' were resolutely against Ukrainian national independence.

9. The Coup d'Etat in Ukraine and the Rule of Skoropadsky (29. 4. 1918 — 14. 11. 1918)

Declaring Ukraine an independent democratic republic by the 185 Act of January 22, 1918, the Ukrainian Central Council passed 423 simultaneously a wide programme of economic reforms in agriculture and industry. By this the Ukrainian Parliament wished to take away the basis for the demagogical propaganda of the Communists against the 'Ukrainian Bourgeois Government'. The Ukrainian Central Council approved in its 'Fourth Universal' a plan of a broad land reform to the benefit of the landless and poor peasantry of Ukraine. It was decided to distribute the big latifundia.

This Bill of the Ukrainian Central Council created great discon- [563] tent among the big landowners in Ukraine who belonged almost 727 exclusively to the Russian and Polish nationalities. The represen- 565 tatives of this group applied directly to the German authorities in Ukraine to abolish the Ukrainian Central Council.

In German military circles this wish was met favourably, for they thought that the big landowners would be able to supply grain for the armies of the Central Powers better than the small peasant husbandry. In German politics the decision lay with persons whose attitude was hostile to Ukrainian state independence, General Ludendorff and others. They thought it might be useful for Germany to afford no possibility for the development of the Ukrainian

727 565 state. On the contrary, they wished to suppress the Ukrainian movement and to make Ukraine a centre for the restoration of 'indivisible Russia', of course, headed by a Tsar. About these plans Ludendorff wrote in his memoirs after World War I. He hoped that a restored Russian Empire would be a reliable ally of Germany out of gratitide for the abolition of the Bolshevik régime.

642 727 565 On April 28, 1918, a detachment of German troops entered the hall where the sessions of the Ukrainian Central Council took place in order to arrest some Ukrainian Ministers. On the next day, on April 29, under the protection of the German troops, a congress of big landowners was called. At this congress General Paul Skoropadsky was declared Hetman of Ukraine, with the prior consent of the German authorities.

Skoropadsky belonged to the class of the big landowners, and, though he was of Ukrainian descent, had had no connections with the Ukrainian national movement before the revolution of 1917.

In his first order Skoropadsky wrote: "I declare myself Hetman of the whole Ukraine". He announced the abolition of the Ukrainian Central Council and replaced the name 'Ukrainian Democratic Republic' by 'Ukrainian State'. Skoropadsky repealed all laws and orders of the Ukrainian Central Council and the Russian Provisional Government; thus Ukraine had in this respect returned to the conditions before the Revolution.

The reactionary ways of the Skoropadsky Government that favoured the big landowners had disastrous consequences for the Ukrainian people; the masses of peasants and workers that recently had fought with arms the terror of the Russian Communists under the banner of the independent Ukrainian Democratic Republic, were placed by the policy of the Skoropadsky Government into [661] a desperate situation. The big landowners who belonged almost exclusively to the Russian and Polish nationalities organised 'punitive expeditions' against the Ukrainian peasantry with their armed gangs having support from German and Austrian army detachments. Heavy contributions, looting, and destruction of the peasants' property, together with mass executions of Ukrainian peasants and workers, caused immense indignation against the Skoropadsky régime and the German and Austrian occupation forces among the Ukrainian people. Against the reactionary régime which dominated in Ukraine, Communist propaganda met with approbation among the Ukrainian masses, unexpected even by Moscow.

727 642 The Chief of Staff of the German armies in Ukraine, General Groener, in order to appease Ukrainian public opinion had declared after the putsch of April 29, 1918, that "the Hetman was given in-

structions that the government he formed had to stand entirely by 227
the principle of a Ukrainian state, without any orientation towards 642
Moscow or Poland". Nevertheless, Skoropadsky's Government consisted in its majority of Russians of reactionary trends who distinguished themselves by a hostile attitude towards the Ukrainian national movement.

The Ukrainian political parties had no confidence in the Skoropadsky régime, they considered it to be an outrage upon the Ukrainian national independence.

Against the Skoropadsky régime and the German and Austro- [669]
Hungarian troops which supported it, mass uprisings began in order to restore the Ukrainian Democratic Republic. Of course, the reaction in Ukraine was 'water to the mill' of Communist propaganda. Moscow knew how to use this situation for its advantage.

At the end of the summer of 1918, the members of the Skoropadsky Government prepared to restore 'indivisible Russia'. Skoropadsky issued an order on November 14, 1918, in which he stated that Ukraine "had the duty to fight first for the creation of an All-Russian Federation, the principal aim of which will be the restoration of Great Russia".

10. The Restoration of the Ukrainian Democratic Republic (November 1918) — The Government of the Directory 669

Against the federation of Ukraine with Russia proclaimed by Skoropadsky, and against the reactionary régime in general, the masses of the Ukrainian people arose under the leadership of the Directory, which was elected by the Ukrainian National League (15. 11. 1918). The Ukrainian National League was created by the Ukrainian democratic parties in summer 1918. The principal aim of the League was the struggle against the Russian reaction in Ukraine which prevailed there under Skoropadsky's rule. When the League received news on Skoropadsky's plans for the 'Federation' with the Russia of the White Generals, it began to prepare armed forces in due time. The National League and the Directory had as their members prominent leaders of the Ukrainian Central Council like V. Vynnychenko, S. Petlura, both members of the Ukrainian Social-Democratic Labour Party, M. Shapoval, Socialist-Revolutionary, and others. Summoned by the Directory, hundreds of thousands of the Ukrainian population in cities and villages joined the uprising. Only in Kiev the Skoropadsky Government held out for some time, leaning upon small detachments of Russian Monarchists and the decisive support of the German troops. On

669 December 12, 1918, a treaty was signed between the Directory of the Ukrainian Democratic Republic and the command of the German troops in Kiev that the German troops had to leave the Ukrainian capital. After this Skoropadsky abdicated and fled abroad with the German troops, having no one to lean upon.

642 The Government of the Ukrainian Democratic Republic was restored in Ukraine. The five member Directory and the Government of the Ukrainian Democratic Republic were headed by the representatives of Ukrainian Socialist parties (President — Volodymyr Vynnychenko). The first Government of the Directory was formed by Volodymyr Chekhivsky.

11. The Ukrainians in Austria Declare their Independence (1. 11. 1918)

563 The Ukrainians in Austria (Galicia and Bukovina) had had heavy losses during World War I from the Tsarist occupation which tried to destroy the Ukrainian movement. On the other hand, the Poles who had the control of the administration in Galicia instigated the Austrian military authorities against the Ukrainians as
[661] against 'Russian followers'. In consequence of this provocation thousands of innocent Ukrainians were put to death in Galicia.

563 In October 1918, the Ukrainian deputies to the Austrian Parlia-
668 ment and the Diets of Galicia and Bukovina created the Ukrainian
National Council as the political representation of the Ukrainians
186 in Austro-Hungary.

On October 18, 1918, the Ukrainian National Council declared its resolve to create a Ukrainian state in the Ukrainian territories of Austro-Hungary. When Austro-Hungary fell asunder the Ukrainians declared the independent Western Ukrainian Democratic Republic (November 1, 1918, in Lviw).

Though the Ukrainian National Council of the former Austrian territories had passed a resolution on the preparation of the union of all Ukrainian territories in one state, the Ukrainians of Galicia and Bukovina distrusted the Skoropadsky régime in Kiev. Just at that time the Ukrainian democratic parties made their preparations for the overthrow of the Skoropadsky régime in Kiev. At the beginning of this action the key position was held by the regiment of the Galician Sich Riflemen which consisted of former Austrian Ukrainian prisoners of war taken by the Russian troops. This was the vanguard of the Ukrainian democratic movement against the Skoropadsky régime.

186 After the overthrow of the Skoropadsky régime in Kiev the
642 favourable moment came for the union of the Ukrainian terri-

tories that had been formerly under Russian and Austrian rule. /86
The Directory of the Ukrainian Democratic Republic issued a 642
special Act on January 22, 1919, in Kiev which declared:

"From this day, the parts of Ukraine — the Western-Ukrainian Democratic Republic, Galicia, Bukovina and Hungarian Ruthenia (Carpatho-Ukraine) and the Great Ukraine on the Dnieper, unite. The ancient hopes which the best sons of Ukraine had lived and died for become reality. From now there is one indivisible independent Ukrainian Democratic Republic".

Relying on this Act, the delegation from Western Ukraine, numbering 65 people, took part in the Congress of Ukraine which had been called to Kiev on January 23, 1919.

The Western-Ukrainian Republic, from the first days of its [726]
existence, had to fight in a heavy struggle against the Poles who 728
pretended to rule in Galicia even after the dissolution of Austria. The Poles invaded the Western Ukrainian Republic after having concentrated large forces on this front. The Ukrainian Government asked the Entente Powers and the Paris Peace Conference for mediation in the Polish-Ukrainian war. In February 1919, a Mission of the Peace Conference arrived in Galicia headed by the French General Berthélemy, and with the participation of the representatives of the United States, Great Britain, and Italy. This Mission presented to the Poles and Ukrainians a plan for an armistice on February 28, 1919. According to this plan, until the final decision of the Peace Conference, the territory of Galicia eastwards of the Bug and Stryj Rivers should remain under Ukrainian administration, while the Western part of Galicia should be administered by the Polish authorities. The Galician territory which remained under Ukrainian administration should be recognised by the Big Powers 'de facto' as an independent state, and the Ukrainian Army should be recognised and trained with the assistance of the Entente Powers. The Ukrainian Government did not accept the demarcation line proposed by the Mission of General Berthélemy as unfavourable for Ukraine. In May 1919, a new Mission of the Supreme Council of the Peace Conference arrived in Galicia, headed by General Botha (South Africa). General Botha's Mission altered the previous armistice draft, and the Ukrainian Government agreed to accept it. However, the Poles rejected this plan.

The small country — Ukrainian Galicia — had to strain all her 726
forces in order to hold the front against the whole might of Poland. From Eastern Ukraine Galicia could not receive any considerable help, because the Ukrainian forces had to fight the Skoropadsky

726 régime and were at the same time threatened by the advance of the Russian armies — the 'Red' from the North and the 'White' from the South-East. But the Galician Ukrainians showed even under these unfavourable conditions a considerable talent for organisation, a high level of patriotism and sacrifice. Galician Ukraine weakened by four years of war, isolated from the outside world and alone, could without foreign help, defend herself for more than eight months against an enemy several times stronger (Poland), could organise efficient administration, and secure order and legality on her territory.

The Poles started a new offensive in May 1919 with the forces of General Haller's army which had been organised in France and sent to Poland for the defence against Soviet Russia. The Polish Government used this army against the Ukrainians. Against the fresh Polish forces the Ukrainians with their poor equipment could not stand and had to leave Galicia retreating to Eastern Ukraine.

12. Ukraine in Her Struggle against Soviet Russia in 1919

669 726 The revolution of the Ukrainian democrats against the Skoropadsky régime met from the very beginning with the irreconcilable enmity of the Russian Communists. It was well understood in Moscow that the reactionary Skoropadsky régime, in 1918, had weakened the Ukrainian national movement and brought confusion into the masses of the Ukrainian people. It was decided in Moscow to conquer Ukraine once more and for this reason an immense propaganda machine was set going. As soon as the Directory had declared the uprising against Skoropadsky, the Central Committee of the Russian Communist Party appointed a 'Provisional Workers' and Peasants 'Government of Ukraine'. This 'Government' had the task of making war against the Ukrainian Democratic Republic. In one of its first acts this 'Ukrainian Government' outlawed the Directory of the Ukrainian Democratic Republic as 'enemies of the people'. Of the five members of this 'Ukrainian Soviet Government' only one, Zatonsky, knew Ukrainian, others were people completely strange to Ukraine.

Against the Soviet Russian troops who invaded Ukraine, the Government of the Ukrainian Democratic Republic fought by military and political means. But the Communists were assisted at that time by the shortsighted policy of the Entente Governments. In December 1918, the French navy landed troops on the shores of the Black Sea to help the army of the Russian Volunteers under General Denikin in the fight for the restoration of 'indivisible Russia'. The appearance of foreign troops in Ukraine caused great

confusion among the masses of the Ukrainian people. The Ukrai- 669
nians who had overthrown the reactionary Skoropadsky Govern- 726
ment installed by the Germans, looked at the French troops with great distrust, for they might renew the rule of the big landowners in Ukraine. In the meantime the policy of the leaders of the French Army in Ukraine was hostile to the Ukrainian Democratic Republic. The attempts of the Ukrainian Government to come to an agreement with the French were fruitless. These negotiations produced only material for Communist propaganda, that the Ukrainian Government 'sold the interests of the Ukrainian nation to the Western imperialists'. The Communist propaganda spread among the Ukrainian Army too. The consequences of this propaganda were disastrous; Ukrainian soldiers deserted the front against the Russian Red Army and some detachments even went over to the side of the Soviet Army. *Thus the French intervention supported only the growth of Communist influence in Ukraine.*

The Government of Ukraine also made attempts to come to an agreement with the Soviet Government. But Moscow remained, as always, hostile to an independent democratic Ukraine and had only
one aim — to take possession of the rich Ukrainian territory. The [642]
Ukrainian Government, formed in December 1918, was headed by the Social-Democrat Volodymyr Chekhivsky. This Government consisted predominantly of Socialists and had also a representative of the Jewish Social-Democratic Party (Poale-Zion), A. Revutsky, as Minister for the Affairs of the Jewish Minority. All that did not restrain Moscow from calling the Government of the Ukrainian Democratic Republic 'capitalist'.

To the protests of the Ukrainian Government against the attack of the Russian Red Army on Ukraine the Russian Commissar of Foreign Affairs Chicherin replied hypocritically: "The military actions on Ukrainian territory are a matter for the Army of the Directory and the Army of the Ukrainian Soviet Government which is entirely independent."

Against this statement the Directory of the Ukrainian Democratic Republic in its wire of January 9, 1919, declared.

"The Directory sees clearly the aim of the Government of the People's Commissars; it wants to bring Ukraine, rich in grain, coal and other products, with the aid of the 'Bolshevik Soviets', under its rule and turn her into its colony."

Before the advance of the Russian Red Army the Ukrainian 726
Government was forced to leave Kiev, its capital, at the beginning 669
of February 1919. In Vinnitsa the Socialist members of the 642
Directory quitted the Government. The member of the Directory

669 726 642 and Commander-in-Chief of the Ukrainian Army, S. Petlura, Social-Democrat, retired from the Party. He was elected President of the Directory in place of Vynnychenko. A Government was formed without the participation of Socialists with Prof. Serhy Ostapenko as Premier. In Ukrainian political circles there was a hope that Ostapenko's 'bourgeois' Government might more easily succeed in coming to an agreement with the French Command in Odessa than a Socialist one. But these hopes failed. The French representatives offered the Ukrainians the choice to become a part of the front of the 'White' Russians against Bolshevism. They refused to discuss the national rights of Ukraine.

The disregard of the Ukrainian national movement revanged itself gravely in the fate of the Franco-Greek troops landing on the coast of the Black Sea. The parts of the Ukrainian Army which had joined the Soviets under the command of Hrihoriev and J. Tyutyunnyk, attacked the Franco-Greek landing forces. These detachments took, on March 1, 1919, Kherson, and on March, 15, Nikolayev, and in the first days of April, Odessa, forcing the French to embark. Thus, because of not fully understanding the Ukrainian problem, the French representatives, through their orientation towards 'White Russia', in spring 1919, helped actually Soviet Russia to occupy Ukrainian territory. By this they strengthened the hopes of the Russian Communists for 'world revolution'. Russian Communists thought that in Ukraine 'the fate of world revolution is being decided'; the title of a book published in 1919 in Moscow was *Where the Fate of World Revolution Is Being Decided.* From Ukraine the Soviet Russian Government planned to send aid through Rumania to the Hungarian Communists, who had proclaimed a Soviet Rupublic in Budapest on 21. 3. 1919. These plans of the Soviet Russian Government failed, for a that very time mass risings and the struggle of the Army of the Ukrainian Democratic Republic stopped the advance of the Soviet Russian troops to the West.

642 669 The Government of Ostapenko, without the participation of Socialists, called 'Cabinet of Agreement with the Entente', was replaced on April 9, 1919, by a new Government of the Ukrainian Democratic Republic composed of Socialists headed by the Social-Democrat Borys Martos. This Government announced its intention to depend on the own forces of the Ukrainian nation itself. At that time, when the Government of the Ukrainian Democratic Republic remained in the Western provinces of Ukraine (Podolia, Volhynia, Galicia), in Central Ukraine, on the Dnieper River mass uprisings against the Russian Communists developed. Even groups of Ukrai-

nian Communists who wished to create an independent Soviet 642
Ukraine participated in these uprisings. The policy of the Russian 669
Communists in Ukraine had a clearly predatory character. The Communist Commissar Schlichter said of the tasks of the Soviet Russian campaign at a session of the Moscow Soviet on March 22, 1919:

"You all remember that when Ukraine was becoming Soviet with every day of the advance of the Red Army we became easier in our minds; the rich-in-bread Ukraine is ours! . . . We have four central supply detachments. We set all hopes on them. We have a lot of workers we have sent out who will be able to overflow all Ukrainian villages. We shall always remember that the looks of the proletariat of Russia are turned towards Ukraine" (*Annals of Revolution*, No. 2: Kharkov, 1928).

Not only by the ruthless pillage were the Ukrainian people put [186]
against the Russian Communist dictatorship; by its nationalist 656
policy, too, it roused great dissatisfaction among the Ukrainians. 191
The Rumanian Communist Rakovsky, who was appointed by Moscow as Premier of the Soviet Government of Ukraine, declared that the Ukrainian language and culture were 'petty bourgeois' and that the use of the Ukrainian language in public institutions was necessary only for 'Ukrainian counter-revolutionaries'.

For this reason the 'dictatorship of the Russian culture' was introduced in Ukraine by the Russian Communists as a 'proletarian' one. "The Soviet Government in Ukraine in 1918 made in fact Russian the official language", — writes the Communist N. Popov in his *History of the Communist Party (Bolsheviks) of Ukraine* (1929). Against the declarations of an 'independent Soviet Ukraine', the Rakovsky Government proclaimed the 'federation' of Ukraine with Russia. There could not be free elections to the Soviets in Ukraine. The power in the villages was given to the 'Comittees of Poor Peasants' consisting often of people sent from Russia. According to the instruction these Comittees were given they had the duty — "to fulfil precisely and relentlessly all orders of the supply authorities . . ."

13. Risings in Ukraine

In spring 1919, when the Soviet Army had reached the Dniester 669
River, Moscow prepared its forces for the support of Soviet Hungary. But at that time the same troops who had fought against the Franco-Greek forces under the command of Hrihoriev, Tyutyunnyk and others, started the fight against the Russian Communists. Of the strength of this movement Rakovsky, Premier of

669 the 'Government of Soviet Ukraine', gives testimony in a book published in 1920 under the title — *Struggle for the Liberation of the Village:*

From April 1, until May 1, 1919, there had been 93 risings against the Soviet Russian regiment in Ukraine; from May 1, until May 15, — 28 risings; from June 1, until June 19, — 207 revolts.

Thus, instead of a 'march on Europe', the Russian Communist army had to fight stubbornly with the masses of the Ukrainian people for the Ukrainian grain.

"Every Pud (36 lbs.) of the requisitioned grain was sprinkled with drops of blood", the Communist Commissar Schlichter wrote later on his supply activities in Ukraine in 1919. The risings in Ukraine happened under the banner of the Ukrainian Democratic Republic. The Government of the Ukrainian Democratic Republic had permanent contacts with them.

The Army of the Ukrainian Democratic Republic, reorganised on Galician territory, started an offensive against the Communists at the end of May 1919. The Soviet Russian troops pressed by the Ukrainian Army, and under the blows of the Ukrainian partisans, were forced to retreat. Soon the Ukrainian Galician Army joined the fight against the Russian Communists.

14. The Polish Army Occupies Western Ukraine in 1919

726 The hundred thousand strong Ukrainian Galician Army fought against the forces of the whole of Poland from November 1918, until summer 1919. At the end of May 1919, the Rumanians who had seized Bukovina on November 11, 1918, occupied Southern Galicia. On June 25, 1919, the Supreme Council of the Entente passed the following resolution regarding Galician Ukraine:

"In order to protect the persons and the property of the peaceable population of Eastern Galicia against the dangers it is threatened with by the Bolshevik gangs, the Supreme Council of the Allied and Associated Powers decided to authorise the forces of the Polish Republic to go on in their military operations as far as the Zbrucz River"*).

Under the pressure of the Polish Army several times stronger than the Ukrainians the latter were forced to leave the territory of Galicia and went over on the territory of Eastern Ukraine. The Polish-Ukrainian war ceased, and between the armies of both states a demarcation line was drawn. However, the Polish Government used every opportunity to extend its occupation over other Ukrainian territories. This Polish policy held the Ukrainian military forces that were fighting against the Russian Red Army constantly in tension, and hindered the work of the Ukrainian Government. 726

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*) The former Russo-Austrian frontier.

The Ukrainian Galician Army took part in the struggle against the Soviet Russian occupation immediately after the termination of the war with the Poles. The Galician Ukrainians wanted to strengthen the Ukrainian state on the Dnieper, together with the forces of Eastern Ukraine, in order to decide later the historic quarrel for Galicia with Poland.

15. Ukraine between 'Red' and 'White' Russia (1919)

In June 1919, the Ukrainian Government, headed by the Social-Democrat Martos (from August Isaac Mazepa, Social-Democrat, was Prime Minister), took up its residence in Kamenets in Podolia. The united Ukrainian Armies were under the command of General Yunakiw, former Professor of the Military Academy in Petersburg. The Government of Ukraine made efforts to secure legality and order in its territory, particularly it resolutely fought the excesses of various dark elements against the Jewish population. In the Government of theUkrainian Democratic Republic there was a special Minister for the Affairs of the Jewish Minority — Pinkhos Krasny (Jewish People's Party); the deputy Minister of Labour was the Jewish Social-Democrat Prof. Salomon Goldelman. 642 563

The struggle of the Ukrainian nation against Russian Bolshevism as well as the entire Ukrainian problem were in 1919 unknown to the world. Against the Ukrainian liberation movement Communist propaganda was made throughout the world, trying to describe the Ukrainian Democratic Republic as a reactionary state. On the other hand, the propaganda of the Russian 'Whites' and of the Poles permeated decisive political circles abroad resulting in the conviction that the Ukrainian movement was the same as Russian Bolshevism. Therefore the Ukrainian Republic which had led a heroic struggle against Soviet Russia was blockaded by the Western Great Powers as 'infected by Bolshevism'. Because of this [1105] blockade the Ukrainian Army was in want of arms, supplies, medicaments. Only by contraband from Rumania was it possible to receive something for the Ukrainian armed forces. Under these circumstances it happened frequently that the Ukrainian Army fought with arms captured on the front from the enemy. But in spite of all these difficulties the united Army of the Ukrainian Republic had considerable successes in the battles with the Soviet Russian troops and, on August 31, 1919, took Kiev, the capital of 669

669 Ukraine. The 'Government of Soviet Ukraine' headed by Rakovsky left Ukraine and was abolished by order of Lenin. This was a new proof of the complete failure of the Russian Communist policy in Ukraine.

But at the same time the Ukrainian Republic met a new enemy who had claims on Ukraine. This was the Russian Volunteer Army under Denikin. The leaders of this army regarded the Ukrainian Democratic Republic as more dangerous for themselves than the Soviet dictatorship in Moscow. Therefore, in its struggle against the Russian 'Red Army', the Russian 'White Army' attempted before all to take possession of the Ukrainian territory in order to [648] prevent the strengthening of 'Ukrainian separatism'. In vain the Ukrainian Government appealed to the Western Great Powers that they should not admit the attack by the Russian Volunteer Forces on the Ukrainian Army and that they recognise the Government of democratic Ukraine. If in 1919 the Government and Army of the Ukrainian Democratic Republic had been given the least support by the Western Powers, the development of Eastern Europe and even the whole world would have taken another course than happened in fact. In any case, by securing an independent Ukraine, Russian imperialism would not be such a menace to the world as we see it to-day.

[731] When Denikin's troops met the Army of the Ukrainian Democratic Republic in Kiev they attacked Ukrainian armed forces weakened by the struggle with the Russian Red Army and decimated by a disastrous typhus epidemic. This epidemic had spread principally in consequence of the blockade of the territory of the Ukrainian Democratic Republic. The Ukrainian Army had no medicaments, no clothing nor sanitary equipment, the Ukrainian soldiers died in thousands, and there was no help. From the army the epidemic spread among the population of Ukraine.

[727] But even under these incredibly hard conditions the Army of the Ukrainian Republic and the masses of Ukrainian people did not abandon the fight against the new oppressors — the Russian Volunteers — who had abundant support from the Entente Powers. The Russian 'Whites' forbade the Ukrainian language in schools, offices and the press in the Ukrainian territory they had seized. Russian authorities ordered the burning of Ukrainian books. The Denikin Government cruelly persecuted Ukrainian patriots. Even the word 'Ukraine' was forbidden; the expression 'Little Russia' was used instead. The Denikin Government restored the estates of the big landowners in Ukraine.

Against the Denikin régime in Ukraine extensive risings of the

people took place. The Ukrainian Government and Army were 669
forced under the pressure of Denikin to leave the temporary capital of the Ukrainian Democratic Republic, the city of Kamenets in Podolia, on November 15, 1919. The Ukrainian Army marched into the hinterland of the enemy. The enormous partisan movement in Ukraine in autumn 1919, stopped Denikin's offensive on Moscow. Of this the Russian Red Army took advantage, broke through the front of Denikin and marched into Ukraine again. The front of the Army of the Ukrainian Democratic Republic, brought into disorder by the war with Denikin, could not be restored at once, and the Soviet Russian troops seized almost the entire territory of Ukraine again.

When the leaders of the Russian Volunteers saw the coming of their definite defeat, they offered the command of the Ukrainian Army which was carrying on a partisan war against the oppressors of Ukraine, an alliance against the Russian Communists. The delegate of the Russian Volunteer Army, Colonel Popov, wrote in January, 1920, to the Ukrainian Supreme Command: "We have what you want — arms, but you have that we have not — the confidence of the population". The Ukrainians declined this offer of the Russian 'Whites' convinced that any alliance with them would bring only damage to the Ukrainian struggle for liberation.

The Army of the Ukrainian Republic began its 'Winter-Campaign', famous in the history of the Ukrainian struggle for liberation, in Lubar in Volhynia on December 6, 1919. This army, by order of its Government, made partisan war on the territories of Ukraine against 'White' and 'Red' Russia until May 5, 1920. Only leaning upon the confidence and the active support of the population could this army cover distances of thousands of miles carrying the banner of the independent democratic Ukraine. The want of equipment did not allow the Army of the 'Winter Campaign' to accept in its ranks many thousands of Ukrainians who wished to fight actively for the independent Ukraine.

16. The New Tactics of the Russian Communists in Ukraine

The failure of the Soviet Russian policy in Ukraine in 1919 656
caused much discussion among the Communists themselves. By 186
order from Moscow, in October 1919, not only the 'Government of 668
Soviet Ukraine', headed by Rakovsky, was abolished, but also the Central Committee of the Communist Party (Bolsheviks) of Ukraine. Among the Communists who had worked in Ukraine in 1919 a group of the so-called federalists appeared that demanded from Moscow more rights for Ukraine. The leader of this group,

656 G. Lapchinsky, explained that Ukraine must be an independent state
186 and not a Russian colony.

668 The powerful Ukrainian movement forced the Russian Communists to alter for a certain time their tactics in Ukraine. The Soviet Russian Government ordered the Communists to pay attention to the national peculiarities of Ukraine. In December 1919, the Central Committee of the Russian Communist Party passed a resolution on the recognition by Russia of the independent Soviet Ukraine. Among other matters this resolution states that the "members of the Communist Party in Ukrainian territory are obliged to realise the right of the working masses of learning their mother language in schools, and speaking it in all Soviet institutions".

The resolution recommends the restriction of the requisition of food from the Ukrainian peasants. Besides, this resolution of the Russian CP pointed out that the principal task of Soviet construction in Ukraine was the requisition of arms from the population. ...

The President of the Soviet Russian Government, Lenin, wrote in *The Letter to the Workers and Peasants of Ukraine on the Occasion of the Victory over Denikin* on January 4, 1920:

"The independence of Ukraine has been recognised both by the All-Russian Central Executive Committee of the Russian Soviet Republic and the Russian Communist Party. Only the Ukrainian workers and peasants themselves can decide the question on their Soviet Congress — whether Ukraine should be united with Russia or left an independent Republic ... We want a voluntary union of nations, a union that would not permit violence of one nation against another".

All these declarations of the Russian Communist Party leaders had the aim to lull the vigilance of the masses of the Ukrainian people. In reality the Soviet Russian Government did not even intend to change its imperialist course against Ukraine. Moscow feared the armed Ukrainian people and distrusted them. Therefore, for instance, a conference of the members of the Russian Communist Party in Homel passed the following resolution in October 1919:

"The advance to the South and the organisation of Soviet administration in Ukraine are possible only with the aid of regular disciplined troops, who, in any case, must not be of local origin" (*Annals of Revolution*, No. 6: Kharkov, 1926, p. 4).

669 The Soviet Russian troops, after having seized the Ukrainian
661 territory until the spring of 1920, began at once the struggle against

the Ukrainian partisan movement. New requisitions of grain and 669
the taking of arms from the population caused an even greater 661
disappointment among the Ukrainians. The partisan movement which had overthrown Denikin's power turned with new vigour against the Russian Communists. These risings were carried on under the banner of the independent democratic Ukraine. The want of arms and supplies did not permit the Ukrainian partisan movement to develop and to attain decisive results in the struggle with the overwhelming forces of the Russian Red Army.

17. Poland — Ukraine — Russia 1920—21

At the end of 1919, the regular front of the Ukrainian Army 648
broke down. The Ukrainian Army continued the fight against 669
'White' and 'Red' Russia as guerilla war. The diplomatic Mission 728
of the Ukrainian Democratic Republic headed by Andriy Liwycky, Cabinet member, started negotiations with the Polish Government about the relations between Poland and Ukraine. The consequence of these negotiations was a Convention signed in Warsaw on April 21, 1920. In that time the Government of the Ukrainian Republic headed by Isaac Mazepa was remaining in Ukraine.

According to this Convention a new frontier between Ukraine and Poland was established: those Ukrainian territories Poland had seized in 1919 in the war with the Ukrainians (Galicia, Volhynia etc.) remained on the Polish side. The Polish Government undertook to support the restoration of the sovereignty of the Ukrainian Democratic Republic on the territories occupied by Soviet Russia.

The war of Poland and Ukraine against Soviet Russia, which was carried on with changing fortunes did not bring the expected results to the Ukrainians. The Polish leaders thought it more advantageous for themselves to come to an agreement with Soviet Russia after having divided the Ukrainian territories with Moscow (Treaty of Riga, March 18, 1921). Poland recognised in Riga the Government of the 'independent' Soviet Ukraine and broke off diplomatic relations with the Government of the Ukrainian Democratic Republic. The Ukrainian Army which in fighting against the overwhelming Russian forces, had entered Polish territories together with the Government of the Ukrainian Democratic Republic (November 1920) was interned. The soldiers of this army, who had fought against Soviet Russia not only for Ukraine but for Poland alike, were placed by the Polish Government in camps in such conditions that many of them died there, or acquired serious diseases.

CHAPTER III

UKRAINE UNDER SOVIET RUSSIAN RULE SINCE 1920

1. The Soviet Régime in Ukraine 1920—21

[656] 668 186 After the resolutions of the Central Committee of the Russian Communist Party and Lenin's letter to the Ukrainian workers and peasants announcing a new approach to the Ukrainian problem (December 1919; January 1920) the policy of Moscow towards Ukraine did not change in substance. Soviet Russia did not trust even the Communists of Ukrainian nationality or those Russian Communists who wished to meet the Ukrainian national demands even partly. The group of Communists-Federalists headed by G. Lapchinsky published in February 1920, a pamphlet entitled *Project of a Resolution on the Party Policy.* The authors of this pamphlet protested against the rule of the Russian element in Ukraine. They wrote on the "mad, and, for the cause of the revolution, disastrous plan of the occupation of Ukraine by the military and political forces of Soviet Russia. After the enslavement of the Ukrainian nation in the times of the Romanovs and Hapsburgs, every attempt to direct the fate of the country from outside will arouse the growth of nationalism".

[665] In the pamphlet, facts on the full dependence of the Communist Party of Ukraine on the Central Committee of the Russian CP are quoted: thus the Communist organisation in Ukraine — "had to fulfil all demands of the Central Committee of the Russian CP, even, if it regarded them injurious to the cause of the revolution in Ukraine".

656 666 Moscow deported the opposing Communists from Ukraine or expelled them from the Party. The Soviet Russian régime in Ukraine thereto was strengthened. For this purpose Moscow gave preponderance to the Russian element in the Soviet administration in Ukraine. For instance, the election system for the 4th Congress of the Soviets in Ukraine in 1920 was the following: from 1000 soldiers of the Red Army one deputy was elected, from 10,000 workers one deputy, and one deputy from 50,000 peasants. It should be remembered that 1920 in the ranks of the Red Army in Ukraine

there were 85% Russians and only 8% Ukrainians. With this 656
election system the representatives of the peasants, the most 666
numerous part of the Ukrainian population, made only 12,7% of the members of this Soviet Congress. Finance, national economy, railways, labour — concisely all foundations of the economic life of Ukraine — were concentrated in Moscow. All Ukrainian co-operative organisations were subordinated to Moscow. During [651]
1920 Ukraine had to deliver to Russia 160 million of Pud of grain (1 Pud is 36 lbs.), 6 million Pud meat, 30 million Pud potatoes, 255 million eggs, big consignments of sugar, etc. The Russian Red Army made requisitions for its needs separately and confiscated in the last months of 1920 about 30 million Pud grain in Ukraine (*Collection of Reports of the Government of the USSR:* Kharkov 1921).

No wonder that in consequence of this exploitation the Urkrainian partisan movement was spreading. 669 At the end of 1920 there were not less than 40,000 Ukrainian partisans in Ukraine who fought against the Russian Communists as an organised force. Evidence of the extent of this struggle is given to us in the trophies of the Soviet Russian troops seized in the war with the Ukrainian partisans 1920—21: 43 guns, 1,812 machine-guns, 31,788 rifles etc. *(Collection of Reports)*. In the course of only one year, 1921, the Soviet Secret Police in Ukraine suppressed 6,000 partisan organisations. (*Communist:* Kharkov, February 11, 1923).

2. The Famine of 1921/22 and the Policy of Soviet Russia in Ukraine 731

The Soviet Russian Government took advantage of the horrible 656
famine of 1921/22 in Ukraine and succeeded in strengthening its rule there. A drought in the fall of 1920 and spring 1921 was followed by a bad harvest, and a great dearth of food arose. A real famine began. However, the policy of the Russian Government in Ukraine, intending to get as much food as possible, did not change. Before the outside world the Russian authorities tried to hide the hunger catastrophe in Ukraine, and directed all foreign aid coming from America and Western Europe into Russia. Though in Ukraine in autumn 1921, millions of the Ukrainian population were starving the Russian Government, nevertheless, took away from the hungry regions the rest of the food stocks, and exported them to Russia. This roused the attention of foreigners who stayed at that time in Ukraine. The American historian H. H. Fisher writes in his book on the famine of 1921/22 that the representatives of the Soviet Russian Government demanded resolutely that it was

731 656 "necessary to request the ARA (American Relief Administration) not to split its forces, *but to concentrate them entirely on the Volga area*" (p. 248).

Professor Fisher remarks in his book:

"The policy of the Communist Party with respect to the Ukraine famine presents many curious aspects. Not only did the Moscow Government fail to bring the Ukrainian situation to the knowledge of the American Relief Administration as it did other regions much more remote, but it actively discouraged... anything likely to bring the Americans in contact with the Ukraine... Before the ARA had begun its operations (January, 1922) the Moscow and the so-called Kharkov Government did not undertake anything serious for the aid to the hungry people of Ukraine" (H.H.Fisher, *The Famine in Soviet Russia:* New York, 1927). Further, Prof. Fisher says in his book:

"From the first the Moscow Government had discouraged all proposals which tended to bring the ARA into contact with the Ukraine. Litvinov (at that time Deputy Commissar of Foreign Affairs, *P. F.*), had described the port of Odessa, back in the fall of 1921, as out of the question for ARA operations, although it was subsequently used very successfully. It is also significant that, until the ARA had investigated and established outposts in the south, Moscow virtually ignored in its press the famine conditions along the Black Sea..." (p. 252).

731 656 439 Prof. Fisher states that the Russian Communist Government exported food from the hungry regions in Ukraine:

"It is astonishing enough that these trainloads of food have been loaded in Kiev and Poltava and sent hundreds of miles to the hungry along the Volga, instead of being transported a score or so miles across the Gubernia line to Odessa or Nikolaiev, where there was a first class famine in swing. It is even more astonishing, when one learns... that Odessa Gubernia, with a crop of only seventeen per cent of normal and with people dying of hunger in the streets of its principal town as well as in the huts of its villages, sent sixty-five cars to Central Russia, while Nikolaiev, with a crop only four per cent of normal, and containing in the city of Kherson the most desperately afflicted spot in South Russia, in fact, one of the worst in the entire country, sent eight cars to the Volga" (p. 261).

On the export of grain from Ukraine during the famine of 1921/22 the American historian brings the following facts:

"The Gubernia of Podolia produced a considerable food surplus. The adjoining Gubernia of Odessa had a deficit, and many people were doomed to starve if food were not brought in. According to

the scheme officially outlined for the good of Russia, the surplus 731
food in Podolia should not be used to save the lives of the peasants 656
in Odessa, a few miles away, but should be carried through the 439
starving regions, placed on board a steamer and sold in Hamburg ..." (p. 323).

A representative of the Relief Committee of Fridtjof Nansen who was in Ukraine at the beginning of 1922 gives the following facts on the famine:

"Eight million souls are starving in the south of the Ukraine, 731
$2^{1}/_{2}$ millions of them have absolutely nothing to eat. A further 656
$2^{1}/_{2}$ millions are feeding themselves on substitutes, such as hay, 261
dried plants, etc., but are not getting any normal meals; three millions have some supplies, but in such small quantities that they will soon be reckoned in the first and second categories. It may be said that before the end of April 7 million souls will come under these two categories. About 700,000 little children who have been brought into municipal asylums do not receive more than one fifth of the normal portion. Child mortality is tremendous. It reaches 50%. In Zaporoje one million souls are litterally starving. 60% are children. Cannibalism is spreading. Ten thousand people die in Zaporoje daily. All the cattle and the horses have been devoured". (*La famine en Ukraine:* Genève, 1922).

The representative of the Nansen Relief Committee gives a picture of the famine in Ukraine as follows:

"The country side is parched, without trees or plants, almost entirely black. The straw of the roofs is being used to nourish men and animals. People relate that they first ate up all dogs, cats, crows that they could catch and then took to the starving cattle, to boot-leather and furniture wood. You hear accounts and find evidence of necrophagy and cannibalism. You speak with people who have devoured their children, their brothers and sisters. You see skeleton-like human forms lying in the peasant's huts, dying, or waiting without hope, to be rescued by death ... Usually no one takes the trouble, or no one has sufficient energy to bury the dead".

In the time when the Ukrainian people were starving in masses, 731
the Russian Government took care only of the aid for the hungry 656
along the Volga. The representative of the Nansen Relief Committee in Ukraine wrote in his report of 1922:

"At the beginning of this year one could have seen in famine-stricken districts of the Gouvernement Nikolaiev such proclamations: 'Workers of Nikolaiev: Come to the assistance of the famine-stricken of the Volga region!' This happened at a time when this

731 Gouvernement had its own 700,000 sufferers, that is, about one half
652 of the population".

"The measure of misfortune here surpasses all that can be seen throughout the famine-stricken Volga areas", the author of the report on the famine in Ukraine remarks.

The horrible famine in Ukraine aggravated by the special 'hunger policy' of Soviet Russia helped the Russian Communists to destroy the partisan movement in Ukraine and to strengthen their rule.

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3. Ukraine in the Time of the 'New Economic Policy' (NEP)

656 In 1921 Lenin proclaimed the 'New Economic Policy' in the
[423] Soviet state. From 1922 peasants and small private contractors were given some facilities. Small landownership was secured for 9 years for the peasants. Instead of requisitions a tax was introduced. Free trade was re-established. In order to appease the masses of the peasants of the peoples oppressed by Moscow, the Communist dictatorship made some concessions for the development of the
[191] national cultures. In Ukraine the Ukrainian language was given rights in schools, administration, in the press and judicature. This was the so-called policy of 'Ukrainisation'.

[631] The Union of Socialist Soviet Republics was proclaimed at the end of 1922 at the Soviet Congress in Moscow. The Communist organisation in Ukraine, consisting of foreign imported elements, particularly insisted upon the strengthening of centralisation with regard to the separatist tendencies of the Ukrainian movement (*Resolution of the Central Executive Committee of the Soviets of Ukraine* from October 17, 1922).

186 But there were also voices among the Communists speaking
668 against Russian centralism. Thus, for instance, at the 12th Congress of the Russian CP in Moscow (April 1923) the Ukrainian problem extensively was discussed. The President of the Soviet Government in Ukraine, Rakovsky himself, had, after the experience with Ukrainian resistance, changed his former opinion on the Ukrainian national rebirth as a 'hopeless matter', his own expression in 1919. Now Rakovsky attacked those Communists who did not understand the importance of the Ukrainian problem and followed in Ukraine a policy of Russification. Rakovsky declared at this Congress that the Ukrainian problem belonged to those problems that "promise us a civil war ... I am beginning to fear for the further fate of the Soviet Government ... In Ukraine we succeed only with difficulties in forcing our organisations, carrying on their work in the conditions of a national fight, to understand the national problem. All our national policy in international relations

is looked at by the majority of the Communist Party in Ukraine, 186
and here in Russia even more, as some sort of strategy, a diplomatic 668
game".

Rakovsky explained that, through the proclamation of the Soviet Union, Moscow had gained ten and twenty times more power in comparison with the previous state. Therefore Rakovsky demanded that the Government of the whole Union in Moscow should surrender 9/10 of its competence, and that this be transferred to the separate Soviet Republics. Together with the Commissar of the Interior of Soviet Ukraine of that time, Skypnyk, Rakovsky demanded that the relations between Ukraine and Russia should be these of a confederation.

Skrypnyk protested at the Congress of the Russian CP against the disregard of the national and cultural rights of the Ukrainian soldiers in the Red Army that led to a forced Russification of
Ukrainians. He regretted that Ukrainian schools were not allowed [162]
for the 7 millions of Ukrainians in the Russian Soviet Republic, outside the Ukrainian Soviet Republic,[2] Skrypnyk sharply criticised the nationalism of the Russian Communists in Ukraine who did not admit the Ukrainian language in public and Party institutions.

The Russian Communist N. Bukharin stated in a speech at the 12th Congress of the Party that the Communist organisation in Ukraine had a Russian-Jewish composition with a very small number of Ukrainians. And in the meantime, Bukharin said, — "in Ukraine there is a very strong national movement" (*Records of the 12th Congress of the Russian CP*).

However, the demands of those Communists who wished to re- 631
strict Russian centralism and enlarge the rights of the separate Soviet Republics did not attain a majority at the Congress of the Russian CP. In July 1923, the strictly centralist Constitution of the USSR was ratified. Besides the theoretical declaration of the equality of rights of nations and the 'right of separation' of the peoples from Russia this constitution actually concentrates all power in the hands of Moscow, so that the acts and orders of the 'All-Union Government' are valid even then if the separate Soviet Republics would protest against them.

The policy of Soviet Ukrainisation was limited mostly to those 186
institutions which had to deal with the peasants. But in the towns 665
and industrial centres the Russian Communists tried to prevent the admission of the Ukrainian language by every means. For this reason quarrels between Ukrainian and Russian Communists arose in the ranks of the Communist Party in Ukraine. Thus the Communist Alexander Shumsky, the Commissar of Education in

[2] [in the year 1922--Analyst]

186 Ukraine, demanded that the Communist Party stopped its policy of
665 Russification of the Ukrainian workers. On May 12, 1926, Shumsky declared at a session of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the CP of Ukraine:

"In the Party, the Russian Communists are ruling, who treat the Ukrainian Communists with distrust and enmity".

In a letter to the Central Committee of he CP of Ukraine of February 1927, Shumsky[1] wrote: "The Ukrainian Communist feels himself indeed a stepson of the Party".

[558] For this 'deviation' the top institutions of the Communist Party resolutely condemned Shumsky. He was deprived of his office and sent to Russia.

656 A new 'deviation' was detected in the CP of Ukraine in 1928.
186 The Communist Volobuyev showed in his articles that economically Ukraine was a Russian colony. He demanded for Ukraine
687 the securing of a free economic development. Volobuyev published figures which proved that Ukraine was giving Russia almost 1/3 of her incomes without equivalent. He pointed out that Russia was sending workers from Russia into Ukraine, thus artifically creating a majority of Russian elements in the Ukrainian industrial centres *(The Bolshevik of Ukraine,* No. 3: Kharkov, 1928). Volobuyev was punished alike for this 'nationalist deviation'.

186 In spite of all these difficulties and hindrances created by the
517 Russian Government for the development of Ukrainian culture, the time of 'Ukrainisation' gave some gains for cultural Ukrainian progress, even in the conditions of the Communist dictatorship: Ukrainian shools — elementary, secondary and academic — had been organised; the Ukrainian Academy of Science developed its work extensively. In a few years of cultural work the cadres of a
[538] new Ukrainian intelligentsia were created. The Ukrainian literary production developed in spite of all obstacles on the part of the Soviet régime. The protest against the oppression of Ukraine by Moscow appeared also in the Ukrainian literature: a trend arose in the Ukrainian literature with orientation towards the free civilisation of Western Europe, against Russian Communist rule (the Communist Khvylyovy). Against such 'heresy' Moscow acted with ruthless repressions.

4. Ukraine in the Time of the First Five Years Plan
(1929—1934)

185 The policy of collectivisation and industrialisation started in 1929 with enormous demands on Ukrainian national economy. Moscow used the Ukrainian national economy predominantly for

[1, Alexander Shumsky, Commissar of Education -- Analyst]

the industrialisation of Russia. The production of the heavy in- 185
dustries in Ukraine gave in 1931 63% of the whole output of coal, [433]
83% of the production of coke and 77% of iron ore of the USSR
(*Izvestia:* Moscow, March 1, 1932). "The production of the Ukrai-
nian plants solves the entire problem of metals in the whole Soviet
Union" — the Kharkov *Communist* wrote on October 13, 1931.
With these demands on the Ukrainian national economy Moscow
placed the workers of Ukraine in the worst conditions. In the wage [465]
index the Ukrainian metal workers stood in 1931 in the 11th place,
the miners in the 19th, the coke workers in the 27th place (*Izvestia:*
Moscow, February 1, 1932). The conditions of work, dwelling, so-
cial insurance and cultural service of the workers in Ukraine were
much worse than in Russia.

The forced collectivisation of the Ukrainian agriculture, started 474
in 1929/30, caused horrible devastation among the Ukrainian peas- 241
ants. Not less than 200,000 farms were destroyed, their property 661
was taken into the collective farms (*Communist*, Kharkov, Decem- 565
ber 21, 1934). The owners of these farms, the so-called 'kulaks', were deported together with their families into the North of Russia, where they mostly died of hunger and disease caused by forced labour. If one counts a normal Ukrainian peasant family at least 6 persons the number of those ruined and destroyed by this collectivisation reached 1,200,000 persons. In reality the number of the victims of Stalin's 'General Line' was much greater.

This 'liquidation of the kulaks as a class' has not only taken the lives of millions of Ukrainian farmers: it has destroyed the best elements among the peasants. These peasants were no 'exploiters': they were able farmers who tilled their land in the sweat of their brows and produced grain for their families and for the market. Due to this absurd and cruel 'liquidation of the kulaks' the shortages in the supply of agricultural products grew enormously.

Simultaneously with the 'General Line' the centralisation in
Ukraine to Moscow's advantage was tightened: in the administra- 871
tion, in both economy and cultural work. In November 1929, the [241]
Commissariat of Agriculture of Ukraine was abolished and Ukrainian agriculture was subordinated directly to Moscow. The autonomy of Ukraine in the field of education was considerably restricted; in 1931 the separate Commissariat of the Interior in Ukraine was abolished; in 1933 the Commissariat of Justice was subordinated to Moscow, etc.

According to the directives from Moscow the Ukrainian culture had to be 'national in form, Communist in content'. Therefore

871 656 [814] every teacher in the schools in Ukraine had orders to spread Communist propaganda, to fight the appearance of national discontent with the Russian rule by every means, and was obliged to insult the struggle of the Ukrainian people for liberation. In schools, Ukrainian history was falsely interpreted as well as in literature and in films. For instance, clinging to the tradition taken from Tsarist Russia, the Hetman of Ukraine Ivan Mazeppa who at the beginning of the 18th century wanted to free Ukraine from Muscovite dependence, has in Soviet historiography the epithet of a 'traitor' and 'reactionary'. But Tsar Peter I. and Tsar Ivan the Terrible, are glorified by Soviet school and science as 'progressive democratic rulers'.

659 661 The Ukrainian religious life under the régime of Soviet Russian occupation had to suffer from special persecutions. In 1921, in Soviet Ukraine the Ukrainian Greek Orthodox Autocephal Church, independent of the Moscow Patriarch, was organised. This Church, headed by its idealistic leaders, the Metropolitan Vasyl Lypkivsky, Volodymyr Chekhivsky, former Premier of the Government of the Ukrainian Democratic Republic in 1918—19 and others, completed a great task for the cultural and moral improvement of the Ukrainian nation. Moscow attempted to destroy the strong organisation of the Ukrainian Autocephal Church with the help of its agents, but did not succeed in this. Then the Soviet Government ruined by bloody repressions the Ukrainian Church after having destroyed its entire hierarchy and masses of its followers (1929).

661 517 815 In connection with the 'General Line' which had placed unbearable burdens on Ukrainian economy, a mass discontent against Moscow increased among the Ukrainians. The ruthless economic exploitation and political oppression by Russia caused, among the Ukrainian people, a permanent oppositon which appeared in various forms. Therefore, the Moscow Government decided to terrorise the Ukrainian intelligentsia which bore the brunt of the political efforts of the Ukrainian nation. For this purpose a number of trials against the most prominent representatives of Ukrainian science and social life were arranged; the case of the Union for the Liberation of Ukraine with the participation of the prominent member of the Ukrainian Academy of Science, Serhy Yefremov, Volodymyr Chekhivsky, former Premier, Professor Osyp Hermayze and others in Kharkov, in spring 1930. Thousands of innocent people, especially students, perished in the prisoners' cells of the GPU without any trial. Simultaneously, the Ukrainian Academy of Science was exposed to repressions. In place of the imprisoned or expelled members of the Ukrainian Academy of Science, the Communists appointed Their own people Though without scientific merits, but politically faithful To Moscow.

appointed their own people though without scientific merits, but 000
politically faithful to Moscow.

The economic and national oppression of Ukraine was felt also 661
by the Ukrainian Communists. They saw the pernicious results of 651
forced collectivisation in Ukraine. The Ukrainian peasants, though 243
terrorised by executions and deportations, had no desire to work for the Soviet dictatorship. In 1931/32 the plan for the delivery of grain for the Soviet state was not carried out in Ukraine. The cultivation area was disastrously diminished. But Moscow's demands on Ukraine grew steadily. In summer 1932, Molotov and Kaganovich arrived in Ukraine from Moscow in order to demand from the Communist organisation in Ukraine the increase of grain delivery. At a Party conference in Kharkov the Commissar of Education Skrypnyk declared that in Ukraine all had been 'swept out' and that in the villages there was a great want of food. With Skrypnyk's view the majority of the members of the Communist Party in Ukraine agreed, and therefore it was decided in Moscow to make a radical 'purge' among the Ukrainian Communists.

5. *Moscow's Terror against the Communist Opposition in Ukraine*

The Central Committe of the Communist Party of the Soviet 661
Union passed a resolution of non-confidence in the leaders of the 665
CP of Ukraine on January 24, 1933, and 'strengthened' the directory of the Communist Party in Ukraine with Stalin's agents, headed by Postyshev. Postyshev directed the repressions, particularly against Communists of Ukrainian nationality. By arrests and executions of Ukrainian Communists Postyshev wanted to terrorise the entire Ukrainian population which was listening to the opposing attacks of the Ukrainian Communists against the policy of Moscow. Postyshev carried out a massacre of Communists coming from Western Ukrainian territories, which at that time belonged to Poland, Czechoslovakia and Rumania (Galicia, Volhynia, Bukovina, Carpatho-Ukraine). Many of them were declared without any reason 'agents of foreign Fascism' and shot without trial — Badan, Maksymovych, Sydorak, Mondok, the last two members of the Czechoslovakian Parliament, and many others.

During this bloody purge the 'old Bolshevik', Lenin's companion 687
from the days of the Soviet revolt in Petersburg in 1917, Commis- 186
sar of Education in Ukraine from 1027—1933, Mykola Skrypnyk, perished. Skrypnyk was accused of 'nationalist' deviations, for he thought that the national problem was not worked out sufficiently in Communist theory, and for this reason himself investigated the

687 186 national problem and encouraged others to do likewise. In Moscow Skrypnyk's theoretical works on the national problem were treated with distrust: for in the CP one is to believe that Lenin and Stalin have given unchangeable dogmas an orthodox Communist is not expected to discuss. In the meantime Skrypnyk in his speeches and articles summoned the Ukrainian Communists to a 'national construction not restricted by anything'. He pointed out that national consciousness should be developed among the masses of Ukrainian people, and that through the development of the national culture certain values should be given to the Ukrainian workers and peasants.

Skrypnyk described the practice of the Russian Communist Party in the national question in the following words:

"For the majority of our Party, Ukraine as a national element did not exist. There was only 'Little Russia', as a part of the indivisible Russia, something uncertain both in its relations with Russia and with regard to its territory and even its language" (Skrypnyk, *Articles and Speeches,* vol. I, p. 291; Kharkov 1932). Frequently, in the Congresses of the Communist Party, Skrypnyk demanded the organising of Ukrainian schools in the territories of the Russian Soviet Republic inhabited by Ukrainians. These views and demands of Skrypnyk Moscow recognised as 'nationalism', he himself was declared as an 'instrument of intervention'. In order to avoid being the principal figure in a new trial Skrypnyk thought it better to end this life by suicide. This happened on July 6, 1933, on the 10th anniversary of the ratification of the first constitution of the USSR, of which Skrypnyk was one of the co-editors.

661 665 Moscow's fears of the Communist opposition in Ukraine are shown by the dimensions of the 'purge' which had been made among the Communists in Ukraine in 1933. During 1933, 35,5% of the members were expelled from the CP of Ukraine (*Communist:* 1, 2, 1934). In some regions, for instance in that of Kiev, half of the members were expelled from the Communist Party. Many Communist organisations in villages ceased to exist and were replaced by 'political detachments' sent from Russia. In the course of 10 months in 1933, in Ukraine, 237 secretaries of Rayon Committees of the Communist Party, 279 Presidents of Rayon Executive Committees, and 158 Presidents of Rayon Control Commissions were dismissed (*Izvestia:* Moscow 28, 11, 1933).

The purge in the public institutions of Ukraine was directed principally against the Ukrainians. The Communist Mykolenko,

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the former director of the Ukrainian National Library in Kiev, declared before the purge commission in 1933: u 661 665

"I am being persecuted, because my name ends with 'ko', because I am a Ukrainian (*The First Results of the Purge:* Moscow, 1934).

6. The 'Organised' Famine in Ukraine in 1932/33

u 731 656 The purge in Ukraine was taking place in the conditions of a famine more terrible than that the Ukrainians had known in 1921/22. If the famine of 1921/22 was caused by extraordinary drought and bad harvest, and was only increased by the exploitation of the Soviet Russian Government, the famine of 1932/33 in Ukraine and the North Caucasus was organised by Moscow according to a plan made in advance: on the corpses of millions of Ukrainians the Soviet Russian Government wished to establish its forced collectivisation.

SU [474] [423] The reaction of the peasants in Russia and Ukraine with regard to the collectivisation was different. The Ukrainian peasant is attached to his own land in another way than the Russian. In Russia the remainder of the primitive 'obshchina', a system in which the whole land belonged to the community, every member of which received at periodical partitions allotments of land according to the number of 'souls' or 'eaters', still existed. For this reason the Russian peasant did not cling to his land, for he did not know how long he could till his allotment. Besides, the peasants in Russia, who were accustomed to obedience during the half of a millennium by the tyrannical régime of the Tsars, obeyed the order of the Soviet Government almost without resistance and went into the collective farms. u [474] [423] The Ukrainian peasant, freedom-loving, with a feeling of personal dignity, refused to go into the collective farms, for he rightly regarded them as a worse economic system than serfdom was. Moscow knew the free, inflexible character of the Ukrainians, and organised therefore the famine in Ukraine in order to break the resistance of the peasants. For this purpose all food the Ukrainian peasant population possessed was in the course of 1932/33 taken by force through the Communist administration. These food stocks were exported to Russia or abroad. As the consequence of this a terrible famine began in Ukraine. The well-known American journalist W. H. Chamberlin calls it 'political famine'*).

Though rumours about the starving of the Ukrainians went abroad, Moscow stubbornly denied the fact of famine in Ukraine. To prevent the world from learning the true conditions in Ukraine

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***) W. H. Chamberlin, The Ukraine a Submerged Nation: New York, 1944.**

731 the Moscow Government, in 1933, forbade foreign journalists to
056 enter Ukraine.

Back in the summer of 1932 the Ukrainian farmers in Canada addressed the Soviet Red Cross with the proposition to send their grain for gratis distribution among the hungry in Ukraine. But Moscow resolutely refused to accept this gift. The hunger catastrophe of 1932/33 was so great that the population of Ukraine died in masses, and cannibalism and necrophagy spread among the people. The peasants of Ukraine, weakened and decimated by the famine, were forced to enter 'voluntarily' the Soviet collective farms. Though the harvest of 1933 was good, millions of Ukrainians did not live to see it.

The dimensions of the devastations of Ukraine by the famine 'organised' by Soviet Russia were carefully concealed by the Russian Communist Government, and are even now kept secret. Only by chance some foreign correspondents learned about the results of this famine in Ukraine. W. H. Chamberlin writes in his book, *The Confessions of an Individualist:* New York, 1941, on the famine of 1933 as follows:

"There were many rumours of mass starvation, especially in the normally rich farming regions of Ukraine and the North Caucasus. [486] The impression that something very abnormal was taking place in the villages was strengthened by the fact that the Commissariat for Foreign Affairs had introduced a new rule forbidding journalists to travel in Russia without special permission — a permission which was never granted when Ukraine and the North Caucasus were mentioned as destinations. The official explanation of this ruling would have deserved an international mendacity prize. It was that the presence of foreign correspondents would disturb the harvesting operations . . . The ban on journalistic travel was suggestively lifted after the new harvest had been gathered in — after there had been an opportunity to bury the corpses and to remove the outward signs of the famine —".

The same author writes about his visit to the Ukrainian part of the North Caucasus — the Kuban Region:

"This had been one of the richest and most smiling agricultural regions in Russia . . . There was an amazing lack of domestic animals; one saw none of the dogs that had formerly rushed out barking when we entered Cossack villages. In the first house we entered at random we found that seven members of the family have died of hunger. Three had survived. We did not meet any peasant who did not tell us of the loss of relatives or friends".

On the famine in Ukraine Chamberlin writes:

"Poltava had acquired a particularly bad reputation; more than 731
once we heard in Moscow of the carts that moved through the 656
streets in the early morning, picking up dead bodies ... In Moscow it was easy to glib officials to deny to credulous foreigners that there had been any starvation. In Poltava famine could not be denied, although its extent was minimised ... While we were visiting a village called Zhuke, near Poltava, two local officials were carefully steering us into the homes of the petty officials of the local collective farm. Suddenly we decided to go into a house at random. We found a girl of fourteen huddled up on the bench which ran around the wall of the house. Had she a father? Yes, he was at work in the field. A mother? No, her mother and her four brothers and sisters had died during the last winter and spring. And her father, as we found, was still an edinolichnik, a peasant working his own land. Marvellous fatalistic stubbornness of a man who would see almost his whole family starve to death and still refuse to accept the new servitude of the collective farm!" (pp. 154—157).

In talks with the population and the reprensentatives of the administration, Chamberlin learned that in 1933 there had died of hunger in the Poltava region almost 15%, in the district of Cherkasy in Ukraine about 30%.

Stanley Richardson, correspondent of the American 'Associated Press' sent on September 22, 1933, the following telegram from Moscow to America:

"Soviet Russia has this year such a good harvest that a repetition of the undernourishment which had recently caused heavy losses of people and domestic animals is imposible. These losses one could see during a journey lasting a week through Ukraine and the Caucasus, the granaries of Moscow".

Owing to the Soviet censorship, Richardson could not give any figures about the victims of the famine in Ukraine. He quotes only the words of a Soviet Commissar in Ukraine named Asatkin:

"A great number of cattle and horses had perished. An exceptionally great number of peasants left the famine-stricken territory, looking for better living conditions. Many of them did not return" (*Ukrainian Voice:* Winnipeg, 27. 11. 1933).

A correspondent of the *Manchester Guardian* who had been in Ukraine in the fall of 1933 gave a report on the Ukrainian hunger catastrophe, according to official Soviet sources:

In 1932 in Ukraine there had been 5,543,000 horses, in autumn 1933 only 2,772,000 remained — loss of 50%; the number of hogs diminished in the same time from 3,472,000 to 1,390,000; the number of sheep fell from 6,652,000 to 1,543,000. The top Communist

731 656 officials in Ukraine confirmed to the correspondent of the *Mancher Guardian* that in this country there had been a great mortality from hunger. Comparing the situation of that time in Ukraine and the North Caucasus with the situation in Russia, the correspondent of the *Manchester Guardin* came to the following conclusion when he said:

"It can be definitely stated that no provinces within a radius of several hundred miles of Moscow experienced the Ukrainian and North Caucasian extremities" (*Manchester Guardian:* October 19, and October 21, 1933).

The correspondent of a Jewish Socialist journal in New York, Lang, gave a description of the situation in the summer and autumn of 1933 in Ukraine: he saw how grown-ups and children were starving to death, he had been in totally depopulated villages where the inhabitants had died of hunger or fled from their homes (*Forwards:* 27. 12. 1933).

The American journalist Walter Duranty 'optimistically' estimated the number of the victims of the famine in USSR in 1933 as 5 million people. Of course, the principal part of these victims were in Ukraine, against which the Russian Communist régime was carrying its special policy of exstirpation.

In consequence of the famine and the repressions in Ukraine, principally men had perished. Therefore for instance, in 1932—33 the women in the collective farms in Ukraine were 60—70% of the total (*Communist:* Kharkov, 26. 1. 1934). The extent of child mortality was shown clearly in 1940; in the fall of 1940, the lack of births in 1932/33 forced the authorities to close parallel classes or abstain from opening first classes in many Ukrainian schools, for there where no children! The consequences of the famine in Ukraine could be seen in the decrease of the cultivation plain of the winter crops in autumn 1933: one million hectars less than in 1930 (*Izvestia:* Moscow, 16. 11. 1933).

661 731 656 Fully to realise the hypocritical policy of the Russian Communist dictatorship in Ukraine, one must add that Moscow tried to lay the responsibility for the famine in Ukraine on the Ukrainian Communists, who, as they pretended, 'had overstepped the Party line'. Many prominent Ukrainian Communists were arrested and shot under the pretext that they had caused the famine in Ukraine as 'agents of foreign capital'.

In the first years of their rule in Ukraine, the Russian Communists dreamt of world revolution and regarded the Ukrainian Western territories under the rule of Poland, Rumania and Czechoslovakia as a bridge for their armed 'march on Europe'. In connection

with this, to a certain degree, was the policy of 'Ukrainisation' 731
directed in Soviet Ukraine: Moscow intended to gain sympathy 656
for the Soviet régime among the population of the Western Ukrai- 661
nian territories in Poland, Rumania and Czechoslovakia. The famine of 1932/33 in Soviet Ukraine roused great distrust and dislike of Soviet Russia among the Western Ukrainians. Therefore Soviet Russia destroyed thousands of intellectuals coming from the Western Ukrainian territories, among them Communists as 'agents who had worked for the money of foreign big landowners and capitalists'...

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CHAPTER IV

THE UKRAINIANS OUTSIDE SOVIET UKRAINE AFTER 1920

I. The Ukrainians in Poland

563 186 After the signing of the Treaty of Riga (1921) between Soviet Russia and Poland, about 6 million Ukrainians remained under Polish rule (Galicia, Volhynia, Polissia, Pidlyasha, Kholm Region). The case of Galicia as that of a former Austrian territory appeared from time to time in international policy. The members of the Ukrainian National Council of Galicia remaining in Western Europe demanded the right of free self-determination for this territory. In February 1921, the Council of the League of Nations stated in its resolution: "Galicia lies outside the borders of Poland", "Poland is only the actual occupant of Galicia". But this and other resolutions could not remove the Polish rule in Galicia. Poland did not care for the resolutions of the League of Nations. However, in order to appease foreign public opinion, the Polish Diet passed in September, 1922, a bill on the autonomy of the Counties into which Galicia had been divided in 1920, and a bill on the creation of a Ukrainian University. In November 1922, elections to the Polish Diet took place. The Ukrainians, having regard to the special situation of Galicia, did not take part in these elections. In other Ukrainian territories under Polish rule, particularly in Volhynia, the Ukrainian political parties attained at these elections a great victory.

On March 15, 1923, in a resolution of the Conference of the Ambassadors of Great Britain, France, Italy and Japan in Paris, the frontiers of the Riga Treaty between Poland and the USSR were recognised "with regard to the fact that Poland had admitted with respect to Eastern Galicia that the ethnographic situation demanded unconditionally an autonomous order"..

563 661 But the Polish authorities had no intention to grant political autonomy to the Ukrainians. Even the rights of the Ukrainians for cultural development were narrowly restricted in Poland. Against the Ukrainians in Poland, a police régime was introduced. In 1920 there were in the Polish concentration camps many thousands

Ukrainians where they died in masses from insufficient food and 563
disease. The Polish Government abolished in Galicia most of the 661
Ukrainian schools which had existed in the times of Austrian rule. [871]
In the schools in Galicia, Volhynia and other Ukrainian territories, the Polish authorities conducted a forced Polonisation. The Ukrainian University that had been created in Lviw in 1920 privately was suppressed by the Polish Government. Simultaneously, the admission of Ukrainians to Polish Universities was made extraordinarily diffucult. State officials of Ukrainian nationality were dismissed in masses by the Polish Government, and new applicants were not accepted. Even the national name 'Ukrainian' the Polish Government did not recognise and ordered the use officially only
of the archaic name 'Ruthenian'. At the elections to the Polish Diet [665]
and Senate in 1928, for the first time under Polish rule, the Ukrainians of Galicia took part. The Ukrainian population gave its voices at the elections for two parties: the party of the democratic centre (UNDO — Ukrainian National Democratic Union — under the leadership of Dmytro Levytsky) and the Ukrainian Socialist Radical Party, led by Ivan Makukh.

After the termination of the Polish-Ukrainian war in 1919, on 727
the Western Ukrainian territories economic reconstruction by the 474
Ukrainian population themselves began, predominantly in the form
of co-operative societies. In 1924 in Lviw the Central Co-operative 563
Bank was founded, and a central institution for all co-operative societies organised *(Centro-Soyuz).* The Ukrainian co-operative movement in Poland was headed by the Revisional Association of Co-operatives, which had about 500,000 members and had more than 12,000 employees. The Association of Ukrainian Dairy Co-operation *(Maslosoyuz),* supplied dairy products, not only for the Polish market, but exported many of its products to the countries of Western Europe.

The Polish Government looked on the Ukrainian economic activity with displeasure and tried to hinder the development of Ukrainian co-operative societies and private economic initiative. In 1934, by order of the Polish Government, the operations of the Revisional Association of the Ukrainian Co-operatives were limited only to Galicia. Ukrainian co-operative societies in other Ukrainian territories in Poland, about 450, were forced to be subordinated to Polish co-operative centres.

The Warsaw Government carried on a systematic colonisation in 563
the overpopulated Ukrainian territories. The Ukrainian peasants were excluded from the right of land reform. Having no opport-

563 unity to move into the towns or to emigrate the Ukrainian peasants
were pauperised.

These conditions were favourable to the growing of extremist trends in Ukrainian political life: communism on the one hand and nationalism on the other.

668 The policy of 'Ukrainisation' in Eastern Ukraine was exploited
661 by Communist propaganda: the 'Ukrainisation' in Soviet Ukraine,
adversited by Moscow, did not remain without influence on the
563 population of the Western Ukrainian territories. The Communists
of Western Ukraine served Soviet Russia as a 'fifth column'
among the Ukrainians in Poland.

The Polonisation of Ukrainian schools, the colonisation of Ukrainian territory with Poles, the refusal to admit Ukrainians to Government service, the persecutions of the Ukrainian press, of educational and economic organisations — all this gave the basis for the creation of illegal Ukrainian groups which began the fight
[725] against the Polish régime with terror. In 1920 the Ukrainian
Military Organisation (UVO) was created in Galicia and organised attacks on the representatives of the Polish Government. Later UVO fused with the Organisation of Ukrainian Nationalists (OUN), founded at a Congress in Vienna in 1929 under the leadership of Colonel Evhen Konovalets. The Polish Government took advantage of the terrorist acts and sabotage attributed to the members of OUN to destroy the Ukrainian cultural and economic life. In September 1930, Polish troops and police undertook a terrible 'pacification' among the Ukrainian population in towns and villages. Polish soldiers and policemen severely beat more than 15,000 Ukrainians, mostly cultural and economic workers, who had not anything in common with the terrorist activity and often were resolute opponents of terror. Many victims of this 'pacification' died after terrible sufferings. A great number of Ukrainian economic and educational institutions — co-operative societies, schools, reading halls and libraries were destroyed.

After the 'pacification', the oppressions against the Ukrainians in Poland grew worse and the Polish colonisation of Ukrainian territories was increased by state funds. In September 1934, the delegates of the Polish Government declared at the Session of the League of Nations that Poland did not have any obligations towards the resolutions of the peace treaties regarding the protection of the rights of the national minorities in Poland.

By this action the Polish Government violated even formally the obligations accepted by Poland in the Peace Treaties in regard to the national minorities.

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The Polish policy aimed at the disintegration of the national life 563
of the 6 million Ukrainians through attempts to divide them into 661
different 'tribes' which were given various names in official sta- 798
tistics: 'Polishchuk', 'Hutsul', 'Ruthenian', 'Boyko', 'Lemko', and even 'Orthodox' and 'Aborigines'. Against the Orthodox as well as against the Greek Catholic Ukrainians a policy of systematic Polonisation was applied by forcible conversion of the Ukrainians to Roman Catholicism which in the conditions of the Polish State was equivalent to Polonisation. In Ukrainian regions the Poles organised on the eve of World War II 'dragonnades' in order to convert the Greek Orthodox Ukrainians to the Roman Catholic Church: armed Polish gangs drove through the villages, destroyed the Orthodox Churches, beat the Ukrainians, looted their property, and forced them by this terrorism to turn Catholic. Thus the Polish Chauvinists protected by the Polish Government destroyed in 1938 more than 100 Ukrainian Churches, among them many medieval and of great artistic value and forced many Ukrainian communities to accept Roman Catholicism. In vain the Ukrainian deputies to the Polish Diet protested against this Polish violence, in vain the Metropolitan of the Greek Orthodox Church in Poland Dionysios and the Metropolitan of the Greek Catholic Church in Lviw Count Szeptycki rose their voices. The Polish oppression caused a strong opposition and resistance among the Ukrainians in Poland, which the Polish Government tried to suppress by new persecutions.

In the entire Polish policy between the two World Wars the fear 000
of the Ukrainian national movement is undoubtfully apparent. The Polish Government did not wish the creation of an independent Ukraine, fearing that a Ukrainian state would later demand union with the Ukrainian provinces of Poland. Even the small Carpatho-Ukraine, which had proclaimed its autonomy in autumn 1938, seemed dangerous to Poland as giving a 'bad example' for the Ukrainian population in Poland. This was one of the reasons why the Polish Government helped to destroy Czechoslovakia and supported the Hungarian claims on Carpatho-Ukraine in 1939.

In September 1939, the Ukrainian territories which after the 661
Treaty of Riga were under Polish rule, were occupied by the Soviet 563
Army in accordance with the German-Russian Pact of August 23, 1939, signed in Moscow. This 'liberation of Western Ukraine' brought to the population of these territories a time of terror and oppression. Thousands of Ukrainians of all classes were deported to the East, many of them did not come back.

The local Ukrainian Communists also were suspected by the Soviet authorities, they were not admitted to influential positions
and were even persecuted as 'infected by nationalism'

563 423 474 and were even persecuted as 'infected by nationalism'. For the Ukrainian peasants a land reform was proclaimed at the cost of the big landowners, but simultaneously the organisation of collective farms was started, and this caused serious bitterness among the masses of the people. It should be pointed out that between the Western Ukrainian territories recently occupied by the Soviet Army and the old USSR a strictly guarded police border was preserved, in order to prevent any contact between the population of these territories.

2. The Ukrainians under Rumanian Rule (Bukovina and Bessarabia)

563 In 1918 Rumania occupied Bessarabia and Bukovina. The first had been a Russian province, the second had belonged to Austria. In these provinces there were about 1 million Ukrainians at that time. From the beginning of the Rumanian occupation, for 10 years, the state of siege was maintained. This paralysed the political, economic and cultural organisation of the Ukrainians. From 1922, all Ukrainian schools were transformed into Rumanian. The Rumanian Government did not recognise the Ukrainians as a separate nation but declared that the Ukrainians in Bessarabia and Bukovina were 'Rumanians by origin who had forgotten the Rumanian language'. During the state of siege in Bukovina the Ukrainian books in the public libraries were confiscated; in the Churches the Rumanian language was introduced. The Ukrainian co-operative societies were destroyed by administrative oppressions. The only sign of Ukrainian national life was the Ukrainian press, but against this press the Rumanian authorities placed various obstacles.

[665] In 1927 in Bukovina the Ukrainian National Party was founded. This party won at the elections to the Rumanian Parliament 3 mandates — 2 Deputies and 1 Senator.

[204] The Rumanian authorities greatly feared the possibilities of the development of the Ukrainian movement, and did not admit in Bessarabia even the Ukrainian press, while the Russian press was allowed.

728 661 In 1940 Rumania ceded Bukovina and Bessarabia to the USSR. The Ukrainian parts of these countries were united with Soviet Ukraine, the territories populated by Moldavians were added to the Moldavian Socialist Soviet Republic, founded as far back as 1925 within the boundaries of Soviet Ukraine. The Soviet occupation by its terrorism and economic policy (forced collectivisation) soon disappointed the population of Bessarabia and Bukovina.

[1. In Western Ukraine under Soviet rule, Sept. 1939 -- Analyst]

though this population had accepted in a friendly manner the Soviet 728
rule, hoping for an improvement of their situation. When Rumania 661
in alliance with Germany joined the war against USSR in 1941, the [726]
Rumanian authorities on their part terrorised the Ukrainian population of Bukovina and Bessarabia. At the end of the war Bukovina and Bessarabia were joined with USSR again. The Communist terror turned with even greater vehemence against the Ukrainians there. Especially from Bukovina a great part of the Ukrainian population had been deported into the Eastern regions of the USSR. The cities were filled with foreign elements, colonists from Russia were brought into the villages.

3. The Ukrainians in Czechoslovakia (Carpatho-Ukraine)

After 1919 Carpatho-Ukraine, which had been for centuries 563
under Hungarian rule, was attached to Czechoslovakia. The Ukrainian population of this country consists mostly of peasants. The towns had a Jewish and Hungarian population. The Czech authorities in Carpatho-Ukraine (official name Carpatho-Ruthenia)
favoured for some time the development of Ukrainian schools. But [191]
from 1925 the Prague Government began to support the Russophile group that despised the Ukrainian language as 'peasant' and used a strange mixture of the Church-Slavonic, Ukrainian, and Russian languages. In reality, these 'Russophiles' were adherents of Hungary and received support from Budapost too. The entire administration in Carpatho-Ukraine came into the hands of the Czech bureaucracy. According to the Treaty of Saint Germain, Carpatho-Ukraine was guaranteed autonomy inside the boundaries of CSR, but the Czechoslovakian Government permanently deferred its realisation.

At the end of 1938 Germany launched strong pressure against Czechoslovakia exploiting the national problem of this country, (Sudeten Germans, Slovaks, Hungarians, Ukrainians). The Prague Government changed the centralistic Constitution to a federative one. For the Carpathian Ukraine the Prague Government recognised an autonomous statute with a separate Diet and Government. Against this the neighbour states — Hungary and
Poland — reacted vehemently. In February 1939, the elections to 642
the Diet of Carpatho-Ukraine took place. After the separation of 726
Slovakia from Bohemia the Diet of Carpatho-Ukraine proclaimed the independence of this country (March 16, 1939). But with Hitler's and Mussolini's consent the Hungarian troops occupied Carpatho-Ukraine after stubborn fighting against the Ukrainian volunteers.

727 volunteers. At the end of World War II the Soviet Army occupied Carpatho-Ukraine. In June 1945 the Czechoslovak Government ceded this country to USSR.

4. *The Ukrainians inside the Russian Soviet Republic (RSFSR)*

563 Inside the administrative boundaries of the Ukrainian Socialist Soviet Republic there are not all territories inhabited by the Ukrainian nation. Soviet Russia did not permit the joining of the north-western parts of the Ukrainian ethnographic territory (the southern parts of the Kursk and Voronez districts) with Soviet Ukraine, though the population of these territories wished union with Ukraine. The Crimea had a considerable Ukrainian population. Together with the Tartars they had the majority in the country. Though the Russians were in minority, Crimea became part of RSFSR as an autonomous republic.

In all these provinces the Ukrainians are deprived of all national rights: they are condemned to Russification.

5. *The Ukrainian Movement in the Kuban Region*

175 The Ukrainians began to settle in the Kuban region from the end
of the 18th century. Here the Russian Government allotted land for
the Zaporovian Cossack Army that, after the destruction of the
Cossack Fortress 'Sich' in 1775 had been for a certain time under
162 a Turkish protectorate. Before the revolution of 1917 the polulation
423 of the Kuban region consisted of 42,9% Cossacks who were obliged
to do military service, for their whole life, and of peasants 52,8%.
The rest were Circassians. 78% of all the land of the Kuban Region
belonged to a state fund, and the Cossacks received allotments for
their military service. The peasants took land on lease from the
Cossacks. The Tsarist Government did not admit the Cossacks to
[517] education. Thus, in this country there was a lack of intelligentsia
of local origin. In the towns there was a considerable influx of Rus-
186 sian intellectuals. After the revolution of 1917 a strong autonomist
631 movement arose in the Kuban Region. The Kuban Cossacks created
their Military Council and their Military Government. In October
1917, the Kuban Military Council proclaimed itself 'State Council',
with the participation of all the nationalities of the Kuban Region,
and a Kuban State Government was created, headed by the Social-Democrat Luka Bych.

669 After the Communist revolt in Russia, the Soviet Russian Government waged war against the region of the Don Cossacks and against the Kuban Region. During the war an alliance was formed between the Kuban State Council and the Russian Volunteer Army

which was led by General Kornilov, later by Denikin. In the summer 669 of 1918 the Kuban Region fell into the hands of the Russian Volunteer Army. The leaders of this army wished to make the Kuban Region a base for the restoration of Tsarist Russia. Among the population of the Kuban Region and in the State Council a strong opposition to the Russian Volunteers arose. But Russian influence was stronger: under the pressure of Denikin's army an alliance of the Cossack territories — the Don, Kuban and Terek regions — for the fight against the Russian Communists was formed at the end of 1918. Against those Ukrainian Kuban Cossacks who defended their independence the Russian Volunteers used terroristic methods: President of the Kuban State Council Mykola Ryabovol was murdered in June 1919 in Rostov, prominent members of the State Council were arrested and hanged. This terror by the Russian 'Whites' was the reason that the Kuban Cossacks left the front against the Russian Red Army and repealed the alliance with the Russian Volunteers. At the beginning of 1920 the Kuban State Council according to the will of the population took the Government of the Kuban into its hands. Vasyl Ivanys was appointed Premier. The Kuban leaders wished to get rid of the protectorate of the Russian Volunteers and to continue the struggle against the Soviet Russian Army in alliance with Ukraine and the peoples of the Caucasus. But in April 1920, under pressure of the Soviet Russian Army, the Kuban Government was forced to leave its territory and to move to Crimea, where at that time the Volunteers' Army of General Wrangel was. Being pressed between two forces, both of which fought for domination in Russia, the 'Red' and the 'White' Russians, the Ukrainian Kuban Government could not attain any agreement with them and went abroad.

The Kuban Region was occupied by the Russian Red Army. 656
Soviet Russia refused recognition of the Ukrainian nationality 19
in the Kuban Region for a long time, and carried on a Russification line through the school and press. Only on August 30, 1929, the Commissariat of Education in Moscow decided that the literary language of the Ukrainians inside the boundaries of the Russian Soviet Republic was the language of Ukraine.

But even after this the Russian Communist bureaucracy hindered [871]
the development of schools among the Ukrainians in the RSFSR. In December 1933, in the Kuban Region and on other territories of the RSFSR, with a Ukrainian population of 7 millions, all Ukrainian schools, press etc. were abolished by order from Moscow. During the collectivisation and the famine of 1932—33 the population of the Kuban Region had enormous losses. Attempts on a rising 000

Attempts on a rising

661 were cruelly suppressed by Russia: large masses of the Kuban population were deported to Siberia.[1]

6. *The Ukrainians in Siberia and the Far East*

167 The lack of land on their own territory forced the Ukrainian peasants to move behind the Volga, the Ural, and into the regions of Siberia. This movement of settlers developed especially after the construction of the Trans-Siberian Railway at the end of the 19th century. Thus, large territories behind the Volga, the regions of Samara, Astrakhan, in Central Siberia, the regions of Tomsk, Omsk, Akmolinsk, in Turkestan and in the Far East, the Amur and Sea Region — the so-called Green Quoin, were colonised.

668 Before World War I in the Green Quoin about 500,000 Ukrai-
186 nians, mostly farmers, were numbered. At that time a Ukrainian
national movement began: educational organisations, bookshops,
theatre performances etc. (centre Vladivostok). After the revo-
lution of 1917, in the Far East, Ukrainian cultural, national,
political and other organisations were created, and Ukrainian
periodicals appeared for the first time. In June 1917, the 1st Ukrai-
nian Far East Congress was called, which decided to demand
national autonomy for the Green Quoin, a territory the size of Italy.
The 2nd Ukrainian Far East Congress created the 'Ukrainian Far
East Secretariat' for the administration of Ukrainian political
affairs of the Ukrainian population of the Far East. The Japanese
occupation of 1920—22, the war of the 'Red' and 'White' Russians
for the Territory of the Green Quoin, did not forward the develop-
656 ment of the Ukrainian national movement there. After having
taken possession of the Far East, the Russian Communists were
hostile to the Ukrainian movement, and hindered especially the
191 development of Ukrainian schools. Though the demands for the
introduction of the Ukrainian language in schools for the Ukrai-
nians of the Far East and Siberia came from the Ukrainian
population itself and from the Commissariat of Education of Soviet
Ukraine, the Russian bureaucracy did not recognise the Ukrainian
language, declaring that this was "a separate group of Russian
population speaking a special jargon" (Z. Ostrovsky, *The Problems
of Ukrainisation and Byelorussianisation in the RSFSR: Moscow,*
1931, p. 33).

7. *The Ukrainian Emigration to Europe and America between the World Wars*

167 In consequence of the occupation of Ukrainian territory by Soviet Russia and Poland in 1920, a great number of Ukrainian emigrants

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[1] [During collectivization and famine in the Kuban Region and the RSFSR, 1932-33--Analyst]

— soldiers of the Ukrainian Army, politicians, state officials etc. 167 had to go into exile. The neighbour states which had divided the Ukrainian territory among themselves had one common interest: to prevent the growth of a Ukrainian movement. However, Czechoslovakia 563 met the cultural needs of the Ukrainian emigrants. On the 873 recommendation of President T. G. Masaryk the Czechoslovakian Government from 1921 procured funds for the creation of Ukrainian Academic Schools in CSR — University, Ukrainian Economic School, Pedagogic University etc. In Prague prominent Ukrainian scholars were living, and here the political life of the Ukrainian emigration developed.

In Berlin the Ukrainian Scientific Institute at the Berlin [815] University was created in 1927. A Ukrainian Scientific Institute was founded in Warsaw in 1929. These institutes developed a considerable activity.

The Ukrainian emigrants, officers and soldiers of the Ukrainian 563 Army who had left Ukraine with their Government in 1920, 186 remained faithful to the traditions of the independent Ukrainian Democratic Republic. The Ukrainians in exile were that part of the Ukrainian nation who could speak freely to the world in the name of their enslaved brethren.

The Ukrainians in America are mostly from the Western territories 563 of Ukraine — Galicia, Bukovina, Carpatho-Ukraine. They 575 are grouped around insurance associations. The oldest Ukrainian organisation in USA is the Ukrainian National Association in New York, founded in 1894. This Association publishes the daily *Svoboda*. The Ukrainian Workingmen's Association in Scranton, Pa., founded in 1910, publishes the weekly *People's Will*. There are also smaller organisations of a similar nature. Between the two World Wars the Ukrainians in Poland had considerable financial support for their cultural institutions, especially for the schools, from American and Canadian Ukrainians.

The Ukrainians in USA are mostly workers; in Canada, farmers. [162 The number of the Ukrainians in the United States is about 1 million, in Canada about 300,000. The Ukrainians in Canada have their co-operative associations, educational institutions and private schools. The centres of the Ukrainian emigration are Winnipeg, Toronto, Edmonton, Montreal and Hamilton. The strongest political organisation of the Canadian Ukrainians is the Ukrainian Self-Reliance League of Canada, publishing *Ukrainian Voice* in Winnipeg. Among the Ukrainians in USA and Canada the Communist 563 Party is conducting its destructive activities, possessing the 575 means even for the publishing of big daily papers in Ukrainian 668

[668] like *Ukrainian Daily News* in New York. However, the Com-
563 munist agency in America and Canada did not attain the success it
had hoped. Among the Ukrainian emigration, the democratic orga-
575 nisations have decisive influence.

In South America too, in Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay and other countries, there are Ukrainian emigrants. These are mostly workers and farmers. They have their cultural and political organisations and publish periodicals in Ukrainian.

The central organisations of the Ukrainians in USA, Ukrainian Congress Committee (UCC), in Canada, Canadian Ukrainian Committee (CUC) and of the countries of South America, created in 1948 the Pan-American Ukrainian Conference for the co-ordination of their activities in the interest of the oppressed Ukrainian people.

CHAPTER V

WORLD WAR II AND ITS CONSEQUENCES

1. Ukraine During World War II.

During World War II, two totalitarian forces contended for domination over Ukrainian territory: Russian Communism and German Nazism. In the first phase of the war the Moscow and Berlin Governments divided Poland between themselves. The USSR occupied the Western Ukrainian territories of Galicia, Volhynia etc., and the Ukrainian territories of Rumania, Bukovina and Bessarabia. By the war with the USSR in 1941, Hitler planned to acquire Ukraine for German colonisation. The German Nazis tried to weaken the Ukrainian population. During the German occupation Galicia was joined with the Polish territories — *Generalgouvernement* — and isolated from the other parts of Ukraine. Hitler gave the territory between the Dniester and the South Bug with Odessa to Rumania. The rest of the Ukrainian territories was put under the rule of Erich Koch as *Reichskommissariat Ukraine.*

The great majority of the population of Ukraine, regardless of their nationality, as well as the population of Russia and the Baltic States hoped that, in consequence of war, the Soviet régime would fall and the time for a free life would come. Completely separated from the outside world, the Soviet citizens did not know anything about Hitler's aims in Eastern Europe, and did not believe the Soviet propaganda. Therefore hundreds of thousands of Jews remained in Ukraine at the beginning of the war, being against the Communist dictatorship and hoping that the German régime would not be worse than the Soviet. The German authorities systematically exstirpated the more active elements among the Ukrainians; especially they terrorised the Ukrainian intelligentsia. A crude description of the rule of the German occupation in Ukraine in 1941—44 we find in the memorandum of A. E. Frauenfeld, the General Commissar of the Crimea, written for Hitler's staff on 10. 2. 1944. Frauenfeld saw the absurdity of the German policy in Eastern Europe, particularly in Ukraine sooner, but dared to write about it only when Hitler's catastrophe became inevitable.

On the policy of Erich Koch in Ukraine Frauenfeld writes in his memorandum:

727 661 "The course of ruthless brutality in treating the inhabitants of the country by principles and methods used in past centuries against coloured slave peoples, and the fact sneering at every sound policy that the disregard of this nation found its expression not only in the treatment of the people but was expressed at every possible and impossible opportunity again and again and was in addition printed and published in pamphlets, is a proof of the complete lack of instinct in handling of foreign peoples, which, with regard to its consequences, cannot be called other than shocking and catastrophic".

Frauenfeld shows this 'policy with the blacksmith's hammer' which would not see the inevitable reaction of the Ukrainians on such barbarism:

"There must be a naivety bordering on narrow-mindedness to believe that in the 20th century a nation having a shocking tragic history but, however, having a historical past, even if it is of another breed than the German people, — undoubtedfully has certain qualities of race and character, will permit itself to be degraded and insulted permanently and will also delightedly place its working power and capacities at the service of the tyrant".

Frauenfeld quotes the words of the Reichskommissar Erich Koch, who during a journey from Rivne (Rovno) to Kiev said to his staff:

"If I should find a Ukrainian worthy to sit with me at one table I must shoot him".

Frauenfeld cites examples from the work of the German administration headed by Erich Koch: the closing of schools, theatres, libraries, inattentiveness to epidemics among the Ukrainians, deliberate furtherance of the dying out of the Ukrainian people. As Frauenfeld witnesses, his collegues were very satisfied with the spreading of epidemics in Ukraine: "The Ukrainian needs no physicians; if an epidemic breaks out, thousands and tens of thousands will perish".

466 727 For the needs of the German economy the German Nazi Government took working power from Ukraine. Frauenfeld writes about this:

661 "There was, for instance, the enlisting for work in Germany. That was carried out in a way that bears close comparison with the Bolshevik deportations to Siberia. From camps surrounded by barbed wire, from grated waggons to the encircling and searching of villages by surprise, and nocturnal levying in which people were taken in GPU manner out of their beds, the whole technique of the Arab slave hunters among the negroes of Africa in past centuries was used".

727 661 The Germans did not touch the Soviet collective farms, because they regarded them as the best method for exploiting the peasants. On the other hand, the German authorities did not wish to permit the partition of the land, for they prepared Ukraine for German colonisation.

[181] Frauenfeld points out the high physical and moral qualities of the Ukrainians, their highly developed consciousness of personal dignity and their aspiration for education. He witnesses that the closing of schools by the German authorities in Ukraine roused the greatest dissatisfaction among the Ukrainian people:

"The Ukrainians, especially the women, are very desirous of learning, and one could hear from them: 'Under the Bolsheviks we were starving, but we could learn something at least. Under your rule we cannot even learn. This proves that you are our enemies' . .".

The author of the memorandum comes to the conclusion that the Ukrainians should not be exstirpated in the interests of Hitler's 'racial policy'; on the contrary "the often genuine blond and blue-eyed as well as brunette population" should be assimilated for such an assimilation "would be without doubt more desirable and advantageous than many we had absorbed during our history, or are even trying to suck up . . ."*).

725 668 Against pillage, terror, oppression and humiliation the Ukrainian people reacted with great vehemence, in spite of the extraordinary weakening by the previous Soviet terrorism, the famine and the war. In all parts of Ukraine risings broke out. This Ukrainian partisan movement helped to a great extent to defeat the German armies in Ukraine. But this was not a proof of affection of the Ukrainians for Soviet Russia. The Ukrainian partisan movement took place under the banner of an independent Ukraine. The initiative for the creation of the Ukrainian Partisan Army (UPA) came from officers of the army of the Ukrainian Democratic Republic in 1941.

The Ukrainian Partisan Army turned its weapons after the defeat of Germany against the new oppressor — Soviet Russia.

2. *Ukraine after the War*

727 000 In the course of World War II the entire territory inhabited by Ukrainians from the Caucasus to the Carpathian Mountains came under the rule of Soviet Russia. The Ukrainian nation, from the

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*) Gauleiter A. E. Frauenfeld, *Denkschrift über die Probleme der Verwaltung der besetzten Ostgebiete: 10. 2. 1944* (Document No. 5394, Office of Chief of Counsel for War Crimes).

661 The Ukrainian nation, from the famine of 1921/22 and later years, suffered under the Soviet terrorist régime great losses of its biological substance. To this were added the enormous losses in World War II, in the risings and from the terror of both totalitarian régimes.

731 In 1946 Ukraine had to suffer from a new famine in consequence of a bad harvest, and it must be stated that the policy of Moscow with respect to hungry Ukraine had not changed; the Ukrainian people received aid from the Communist Government only in a minimum degree. The principal aid came from America.

165 The statistics count the losses of the Ukrainian people during the Soviet Russian rule in Ukraine in millions. In 1917 approximately 30,000,000 people inhabited the territory of Ukraine within the frontiers of Soviet Ukraine before the outbreak of war in 1939. The Soviet statistics gave the figure of 31,000,000 inhabitants of Ukraine in 1933. The census of January 1939 counted a population of only 30,960,000 in Ukraine. These figures show clearly the consequences of the Soviet Russian policy of exstirpation in Ukraine. If a normal increase of population had taken place, the population of Ukraine should have reached at least 40,000,000. Thus Ukraine had had from 1917 to 1939 a loss of 10,000,000 inhabitants! (comp. Frank Lorimer, *The Population of the Soviet Union — History and Prospects:* Geneva, 1946).

An entirely different picture statistics show in Russia: from 78 million in 1926 the Russians grew to 99,3 million in 1939. These figures speak for themselves.

000 After World War II, the Russian Communist dictatorship is playing on the strings of the traditional Russian nationalism and imperialism more than before. 'The great Russian nation', 'the great Russian language' and similar epithets doubtless inspire the Russians and make them an obedient instrument of Moscow's imperialistic policy.

During World War II a new political trend appeared among the Russian emigrants who had fought at the beginning of the revolution in the 'White Armies' against the Communist dictatorship. This was the movement of so-called 'Soviet Patriots', who began to return in masses to Russia, especially from France, inspired by the prospects of the growth of the Russian Empire under Communist leadership.

In the Soviet Union the national movements of the subjugated peoples are officially regarded as the 'principal danger'. Therefore, the Soviet Government is making haste in 'liquidating' entire nations which Moscow has recognised as 'reactionary' — Crimean Tartars, the peoples of the North Caucasus, etc. Of course, the

Of course, the 656
Ukrainian problem has remained from old times for Soviet Russia 661
the basic problem of its internal and foreign policy. The unceasing Russification policy against the Ukrainians is carried on by particularly cunning methods: the Ukrainian language is not yet [191]
abolished definitely in the offices of Soviet Ukraine. But that official who speaks Ukrainian also in his family and in private relations becomes in the eyes of the Soviet authorities suspicious, and has to suffer repressions.

The Communist theory of the national problem worked out by Lenin preaches the 'fusion of nations'. Basing on this, the Russian Communist Government is trying to 'fuse' the nations of the Soviet Union with the Russians. Against peoples who oppose forced Russification, ruthless repressions are used by Moscow. Even the mentioning of the national rights of the non-Russian peoples is condemned in the USSR as 'bourgeois nationalism'.

There is a great principal difference between the situation of the 000
Russians and the peoples united by force with this state: though the Russians are not satisfied with the Communist dictatorship, they do not, however, feel national oppression. Even in the new anthem of the USSR it is said that this state was rallied by Great Russia. We can state the efforts of Russian political groups opposing the Communist régime to maintain the rule of the Russian state over the territories conquered by Soviet Russia, even after the eventual fall of the Soviet régime.

As a curious fact we can quote the view of the well-known Communist L. Trotzky, who was assassinated in Mexico during World War II, on the Ukrainian problem. Trotzky demanded in 1939 the full separation of Ukraine from Russia. But Trotzky thought of an independent Ukraine in the form of a Soviet Republic. This naturally deprived his thesis of all seriousness, for Trotzky needed the slogan of an independent Ukraine only as a political argument in polemics against Stalin (*Bulletin of the Opposition*, No. 77/78, 1939).

As the facts prove, the Ukrainian nation has to endure the heaviest oppression in the USSR. Unfortunately, the words of the famous historian of France Charles Seignobos written in 1913 on Ukraine, can be used emphatically to describe the outstanding feature of the present state of the Ukrainian nation: "Here is the most oppressed nation" ("Voici la nation la plus opprimée", *Les Annales des Nationalités:* Paris, 1913).

In its equalising policy, the Soviet Russian Government retains, 659
also, traces of the Tsarist régime in the affairs of Church and reli- 792
gion. Thus, after having seized Galicia and Carpatho-Ukraine dur- 661

657 ing World War II, the Soviet Government abolished the Ukrainian
798 Greek-Catholic Church by force, against the will of the popula-
661 tion, and destroyed the hierarchy of this Church. The Ukrainian
Greek Catholics who were in union with Rome were ordered to become subordinate to the Greek-Orthodox Patriarch of Moscow, who is backed by the Soviet Government.

000 The struggle of the Ukrainians against Russian imperialism did not cease after World War II. It is being conducted in various forms. In this struggle other peoples who are oppressed by Russia, from the Baltic Sea to the Balkans, the Caucasus and the Turkestan, participate. Thus a common front of freedom-loving peoples against despotic Russia is being created.

656 In 1949, Moscow has permitted Ukraine to use an own flag and
186 an own different anthem. However, this cannot be regarded an ex-
661 tension of the rights of Ukraine in the Soviet Union. It seems to
be more an attempt to bring the so-called satellite countries to the Ukrainian level.

Moscow is watching attentively every expression of Ukrainian political thought and national sentiment, and wants to have everything under its control. The Decade of Ukrainian Culture held in Moscow in July 1951, ended with rebukes and threats against the participants of the Decade, and a 'purge' among the Ukrainian Communists whom Moscow imputes 'bourgeois nationalism'. Only the Russian Communists have beeen beyond any doubt as regards their 'internationalism'; there was no case that the manifestations of nationalism among the Russian Communists had been condemned by the Communist Party. On the contrary, Moscow is cultivating an exaggerated national pride among the Russian people. The Ukrainian Communists are under a especially heavy control of
[554] Moscow. No Ukrainian has been General Secretary of the Communist Party of Ukraine. This position has always been occupied by people sent from Moscow: Molotov, Kaganovich, Postyshev, Khrushchev, finally Melnikov.

'Titoism' is no isolated phenomenon in the relations between imperialist Russia and Yugoslavia. Similar trends hostile to Russian imperialism have existed among Ukrainian Communists since the first days of Soviet Russian occupation in Ukraine. The Russian terrorism prevented these trends, however, from getting strong. Nevertheless, they exist clandestinely. Moscow's persecution of 'burgeois nationalism' among the Ukrainian Communists gives an eloquent proof of Ukrainian opposition against Russian imperalism.

8:Fedenko H-4,5 (no date) 1951 R01 Ukraine R01

3. *The New Ukrainian Political Emigration*

In consequence of the occupation of all Ukrainian territories by 167
the armies of Soviet Russia, hundreds of thousands of Ukrainians 186
had to remain outside the borders of their fatherland. In the first
years after the termination of the war, the Ukrainian emigrants liv- 668
ed in Displaced Persons' Camps in Germany and Austria. Now the Ukrainians can be seen in all European and American countries, in Australia and New Zealand. These are all people who, for national and political reasons, opposed repatriation into a Ukraine oppressed by the Communist Government. They declared repeatedly, when they were threatened with forced repatriation, that they would sooner commit suicide than fall into the hands of their oppressors.

The Ukrainian emigrants in Europe and America are developing a considerable political and cultural activity. The central institutions of the Ukrainian political parties are remaining in exile where their press is being published, the elementary, secondary and academic schools are being operated — the Ukrainian University in Munich, the Ukrainian Technical University in Germany, until 1945 in Bohemia, and others.

After World War II the Ukrainian émigrés have created more [815]
scientific institutions: The Scientific Shevchenko Society, a continuation of the identical Society which had existed in Lviw since 1874, and had been destroyed by the Communist régime, and the Ukrainian Free Academy of Science. These Ukrainian Scientific Societies are working effectively and have their branches in Europe and in America.

Under these circumstances, when in Ukraine enslaved by Soviet Russia, the Ukrainian political life is suppressed and cannot show itself freely, the Ukrainian emigrants think it their duty to speak in the name of their nation in the defence of its rights before civilised mankind. For this purpose the leaders of the Ukrainian parties created the Ukrainian National Council in July 1948, as the political representation of the Ukrainian nation. The Ukrainian National Council continues the tradition of the independent Ukrainian Democratic Republic which had been created through the will of the Ukrainian nation in 1918—1919. Many of the participants of the Ukrainian fight for liberation and many of the leaders of the Ukrainian Democratic Republic are still living. These men believe firmly that the time for the free state existence of the Ukrainian nation will come.

4. *Conclusions and Prospects*

000 In this book the most important features of the history of the Ukrainian nation and the most important events of its struggle for liberty in the 20th century have been set forth.

For centuries the Ukrainians had to make enormous efforts in order to ward off the attacks of the steppe hordes. This nation living on the border of Europe and Asia, could, besides its unceasing centuries-long struggle for its existence, simultaneously create great cultural values from which, in the 14th—18th centuries, Poland and Moscow profited.This is a proof of the inexhaustible creating forces of the Ukrainian nation, and gives the ground for believing that this people, under favourable circumstances, would develop their abilities to the highest level.

The struggle of the Ukrainians for liberty in the 17th century against the Polish rule with the assistance of despotic Moscow, did not bring Ukraine the desired results. The Tsarist state destroyed the traditional forms of Ukrainian democracy and autonomous order, and changed Ukraine at the end of the 18th century into its province.

The independent Ukrainian Democratic Republic, created after the downfall of Tsarism in 1917, found its most resolute enemies in 'Red' and 'White' Russia. The short-sighted Polish policy too, with respect to Ukraine, favoured the strengthening of Soviet Russia. It remains an undisputable fact that the Communist dictatorship was enforced on Ukraine by the Russian military power. Without the Russian military force the Communist régime would not be able to attain the rule over Ukraine.

Communist Russia well knows this weakness of her régime in Ukraine. This explains the specially grave terrorism of the Russian Communist Government against the Ukrainian nation.

As we saw, there were no means Russia would not use in order to enslave Ukraine, even if millions of Ukrainians should die in consequence. This bitter experience under Russian rule convinced the Ukrainians even more that, in future, the ways of Ukraine and Russia must lie apart. The Russian imperialim must fall. The nations oppressed by Soviet Russia must regain their independence in the form of democratic states. From Russia must be taken all possibility of power to enslave foreign peoples or endanger their freedom. Unfortunately, it must be stated that imperialism is a phenomenon common to all Russian political trends — dictatorial, monarchist and democratic. These would like to preserve 'indivisible Russia', created by the conquests of the Tsars and renewed by those of the Russian Communists. This is what the democratic 000 world cannot consent to. A state which oppresses foreign peoples cannot preserve its own internal liberty. Militant imperialism excludes democracy.

Among the Russian émigrés, there are only individual voices making public the deadly danger for democracy in Eastern Europe from Russian imperialism. Thus R. Abramovich, one of the leaders of the Russian Social-Democrats in exile, wrote in the monthly *The Socialist Courier* of October, 1948, published in New York:

"Every responsible politician who thinks of the prospects of democratic development and the overthrow of Stalinism must answer the question, what will the future Russian state, liberated from Bolshevik dictatorship, lean upon? Some authors . . . insist on the creation of a 'strong central government' which could check the centrifugal efforts of all the national minorities. These authors do not evidently know what they are speaking about. The creation of a central government after such a terrible shock as the transformation of the whole political order of the country will be, is, of course, a very difficult affair . . . To make the government so 'strong' that it could, in addition, take over the task of holding those national minorities by force inside the boundaries of the agitated country who are going to separate themslves, is a completely Utopian endeavour. Those who think it possible do not consider the enormous difficulties of this task and the resistance power of the separatist-minded minorities who, however, on their own territories are forming majorities.

Only a cruel dictatorship, which will not be inferior to the Bolshevik one, will be able to master this task. Even if it would be possible to create such a dictatorship, — a scarcely probable prospect, this would mean that the democratisation of Russia should be buried for ever, and that in Russia one dictatorship would be replaced only by another, and there would be no way for a democratic solution of the problem of nationalities. Or should there be expected, with respect to a future war, protection of the indivisibility of Russia through intervention of the allies, USA and Great Britain, who would use their armed forces in order to destroy eventual separatist movements? It is enough to put this question that the answer comes spontaneously".

This quotation gives us an exhaustive picture of the situation in Eastern Europe.

If the British Government after World War II gave its consent for the free self-determination of the peoples of its Asiatic colonies, 000 what right can have Russia then to rule over Ukraine, the Baltic States, the Caucasus etc.?

'The last imperalists' the late British Foreign Secretary Ernest Bevin called the Russian Communist Government. Against this imperialism the whole civilised democratic world must take common action.

The problem of the relations between the Ukrainian and Polish peoples should also draw the attention of the political world. By their intolerance the Polish authorities had produced in the 17th century the Ukrainian revolution of 1648. The inability and malevolence to find a compromise in the relations with Ukraine led to such a sharp struggle that the Ukrainian Government of B. Khmelnitsky was forced to look for aid from the Tsar of Moscow: not from affection towards Moscow but from hate of the Polish oppression. In consequence, Moscow became a Great Power which took part at the end of the 18th century in the dismemberment of Poland. Unfortunately, even after the downfall of independent Poland, the value of the Ukrainian national movement was not realised by the Polish leaders, though it could have secured the balance of power in Eastern Europe.

"There is no Ukraine, there are only Poland and Moscow", — was the slogan of the Polish nationalists in the 19th and 20th centuries. Therefore the Polish leaders made a fatal mistake in attacking in 1918 independent Ukraine and wishing to annex the Western Ukrainian territories. Through this they helped to destroy the Ukrainian independent state and laid the foundations for strengthening Soviet Russia. The results of this short-sighted policy the Polish nation, enslaved by Soviet Russia, has to endure now. The Ukrainians think that Polish-Ukrainian mutual relations could be solved, provided there was good will, to the adavantage of both peoples: the boundary line between Ukraine and Poland should be drawn on the only correct ethnographic principle. Such a boundary could support the good-neighbourly relations among the Polish and Ukrainian peoples.

We cannot hope very much for a fast success of a democratic development of Russia after the downfall of the Communist dictatorship. The tradition of absolutism, tyranny and imperalism, created through centuries of Russian history, cannot be forgotten so easily and replaced by a democratic ideology. For this reason the peoples living in the vicinity of Russia should unite their forces for the common defence of their liberty, and their independence from the Russian threat.

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In case of down-fall of the Communist régime in USSR a great responsibility will lie upon those peoples who have reached a higher level of political culture, especially the nations of the Anglo-Saxon world. All the peoples who are now under Communist rule will need a friendly help of the democratic countries for the creation of a democratic order and for economic reconstruction of the liberated countries. The organisation of democratic political parties, Trade Unions, the reeducation of youth poisoned by Communist propaganda, the organisation of education on new democratic principles, etc. will regard active support on the part of the democratic nations. Otherwise, the danger of a reconstitution of dictatorship and Russian imperialism in another shape will arise, and Moscow can again lay its heavy hands on the neighbouring peoples. It should be remembered that Russian imperalism will not end with the downfall of the Communist régime as it did not end with the break-down of the Tsarist rule.

Russian imperialism which after World War II devoured a great part of Central and Southern Europe, has not stopped in its campaign, but is ready to 'liberate' other peoples and territories in Europe, Asia and other continents alike. The hope of some statesmen that Soviet Russia might be appeased by negotiations and concessions, and that in this way her ambitions would be restricted, has disappeared. Only force and resolution on the part of the democratic Great Powers can stop the pressure of Russian expansion and save civilised mankind from the terrible danger of an everlasting enslavement in the Soviet world state. For the defence of their national and democratic rights against Russian imperialism all freedom-loving peoples of the world should unite their forces, especially with the peoples of Europe in the forefront.

The Ukrainian nation which has been the first to fight under the banner of democracy against Russian Communist dictatorship from December 1917, wants to take part in the democratic transformation of Europe in the interest of world peace with equal rights. Those who desire peace among the peoples must favour their free development in independent democratic states. 'Pax est tranquilla libertas' (peace is quiet liberty). These words of the famous Czech émigré J. A. Comenius who fought for the liberation of his people have the same importance now they had 300 years ago.

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

Warsaw
WHITE RUSSIA
POLAND
U K R A
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Lviv
Kiev
Lutsk
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Chernivtsi
Uzhorod
Drohobych
CZECHOSLOVAKIA
HUNGARY
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
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Dnepropetrovsk
Donets Basin
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Sea of Azov
SEA
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CASPIAN SEA
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